(Resubmitted because it was accidentally auto-discarded.)
Hello list and ZmnSCPxj,
>Non-participants cannot safely (non-custodially) use any such
>"shared-ownership update system" and any subsystems within it since they have
>no power to refuse to sign off an invalid state transition.
I'm not
Good morning Trey,
> One thing
> we've talked about is if you and your counterparty want to route
> payments through each other but also want to enter into discreet log
> contracts, it might make sense to set up a subchannel for each purpose
> so you don't have to re-sign for all the potential
Corné Plooy writes:
>> The total_decorrelation_secrets serves as the payer-generated shared
>> secret between payer and payee. B cannot learn this, and thus cannot
>> fake its own secret. Even if it instead offers ((I + K[A]) + k[z] *
>> G) for a new secret k[z], it cannot know how to change
> * layer 0 (to B): decorrelation_secret = k[b]
> * layer 1 (to B): total_decorrelation_secrets = k = k[a] + k[b]
I would have less trouble understanding that if it were layer 1 (to C)
instead of (to B).
> The total_decorrelation_secrets serves as the payer-generated shared secret
> between
Good morning list, and also Trey,
I confirmed that Trey accidentally replied only to me, but intended to reply to
the list.
> > Burchert-Decker-Wattenhofer channel factories are essentially multiparty (>
> > 2 participants) "channels" ("offchain updateable cryptocurrency systems")
> > with
