Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Nadav, and list, > > More generally, all Boolean logic can be converted to one of two standard > forms. > > - sum-of-products i.e. `||` over `&&` > - product-of-sums i.e. `&&` over `||` > > For example an XOR can be converted to the sum-of-products form: > > A ^ B = (!A

Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Nadav, and list, > > More generally, all Boolean logic can be converted to one of two standard > forms. > > - sum-of-products i.e. `||` over `&&` > - product-of-sums i.e. `&&` over `||` > > For example an XOR can be converted to the sum-of-products form: > > A ^ B = (!A

Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Nadav, > Hey ZmnSCPxj, > > Your earlier post about how to accomplish ORing points without verifiable > encryption was super interesting. > > I think this contains a clever general NOT operation where you double the > payment and use the point as a condition for the "cancellation

Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread Nadav Kohen
Hey ZmnSCPxj, Your earlier post about how to accomplish ORing points without verifiable encryption was super interesting. I think this contains a clever general NOT operation where you double the payment and use the point as a condition for the "cancellation payment." This is actually very

Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Andres, > > > Is there any disadvantage about using dual-hash HTLCs? > > > Is it supported by the current LN spec? > > > > It is no supported by current LN spec, and PTLCs are overall superior (they > > are equivalent to having any number of hashes, not just 2 that dual-hash > >

Re: [Lightning-dev] Escrow Over Lightning?

2021-02-12 Thread Andrés G . Aragoneses
Hey ZmnSCPxj, On Fri, 12 Feb 2021 at 08:52, ZmnSCPxj wrote: > Good morning Andres, > > > Hey ZmnSCPxj, > > > > On Thu, 11 Feb 2021 at 15:33, ZmnSCPxj wrote: > > > > > Good morning Andres, > > > > > > > This looks cool but would hinder UX too much for certain scenarios: > e.g. if the escrow in

Re: [Lightning-dev] Hold fee rates as DoS protection (channel spamming and jamming)

2021-02-12 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning Joost, > > Not quite up-to-speed back into this, but, I believe an issue with using > > feerates rather than fixed fees is "what happens if a channel is forced > > onchain"? > > > > Suppose after C offers the HTLC to D, the C-D channel, for any reason, is > > forced onchain, and

Re: [Lightning-dev] Hold fee rates as DoS protection (channel spamming and jamming)

2021-02-12 Thread Joost Jager
Hi Antoine, That said, routing nodes might still include the risk of hitting the chain > in the computation of their `hodl_fee_rate` and the corresponding cost of > having onchain timelocked funds. > Yes, that could be another reason to define `hodl_fee_rate` as a base fee rate plus a component

Re: [Lightning-dev] Hold fee rates as DoS protection (channel spamming and jamming)

2021-02-12 Thread Antoine Riard
Hi Joost, Thanks for working on this and keeping raising awareness about channel jamming. > In this post I'd like to present a variation of bidirectional upfront payments that uses a time-proportional hold fee rate to address the limitation above. I also tried to come up with a system that aims