> > I'd be very interested in how many repeat interactions nodes get from > individual senders, since that also tells us how much use we can get > out of local-only reputation based systems, and I wouldn't be > surprised if, for large routing nodes, we have sufficient data for > them to make an informed decision, while the edges may be more > vulnerable, but they'd also be used by way fewer senders, and the > impact of an attack would also be proportionally smaller. > > I’m unclear on what you mean by “individual senders” here? In our > scheme, nodes only track local reputation for their direct peers so > what matters is their history with all HTLCs a peer has forwarded to > them (not whether they come from repeat senders).
Apologies, upon rethinking this I realized I had been mixing two different proposals in my mind. The criticism of sender-based reputation does not apply if all we do is track our immediate neighbors. Sorry for the confusion. > It’s true that nodes that forward fewer HTLCs are less likely to be > able to build a good reputation with very active routing nodes. In the > regular operation of the network, this should have low to no impact on > their activity - they don’t require much from their peers anyway. > During an attack, small and low activity nodes will temporarily be in > competition for large routing nodes’ scarce liquidity and slots, but > will still be able to interact with similar nodes where they have > better chances of building a good reputation. That matches my own interpretation very well, thanks. Cheers, Christian _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
