Good morning mailing list, et al.,
Let me explain the various possible mitigations and their drawbacks.
Many of these are either "LSP trusts client" or "client trusts LSP", in the
sense that it is possible for the second mover (client in "LSP trusts client";
LSP in "client trusts LSP") to
Good morning benthecarman and SomberNight,
As noted by SomberNight, PTLCs does not quite fix this, as the client can still
wait out the inbound PTLC of the LSP and force the LSP to perform an onchain
action to ensure it does not give a channel for free.
Another wrinkle here is that the LSP can
Hi benthecarman,
> the LSP can give the funding transaction signed using adaptor sigs to the
> client and the client can then decrypt the signatures and broadcast the
> transaction. Then the LSP can find the transaction in the mempool and extract
> the secret they need to claim the payment
Hi everyone,
I was chatting with Tony Giorgio the other day and he made me aware of a
potential griefing attack that is possible today on LSPs that provide
Just-In-Time channels.
The attack is very simple, when the LSP receives the payment and then opens a
0-conf channel to the client, the
