Re: [Lightning-dev] Pay-for-Elgamal-decryption-key and its application to Anonymous Credentials

2021-02-08 Thread Joe Miyamoto Philips
(I have replied without changing the subject line byte mistake so I will reply again. sorry for spamming) > But I see the advantage of your idea. If a malicious credential server is > able to identify you somehow at the point of payment then they might want > to selectively steal your money

Re: [Lightning-dev] Pay-for-Elgamal-decryption-key and its application to Anonymous Credentials

2021-02-08 Thread Joe Miyamoto Philips
(I have replied without changing the subject line so I will reply again. sorry for spamming) > But I see the advantage of your idea. If a malicious credential server is > able to identify you somehow at the point of payment then they might want > to selectively steal your money while being

Re: [Lightning-dev] Pay-for-Elgamal-decryption-key and its application to Anonymous Credentials

2021-02-04 Thread Lloyd Fournier
Hi Miyamoto, Very interesting idea :) Usually when dealing with anonymous credentials you are necessarily dealing with a trusted third party so it's fine to just make a normal payment and then receive the credential after successfully paying. But I see the advantage of your idea. If a malicious

[Lightning-dev] Pay-for-Elgamal-decryption-key and its application to Anonymous Credentials

2021-02-03 Thread 宮本丈 via Lightning-dev
Hi all. I want to point out another application of Discrete-Log selling on PTLC lightning since I could not find anyone else mentioning it (in particular, I could not find in the Nadav Kohen's list here. [1] ) The protocol may be obvious to most of the members here, but I believe its application

[Lightning-dev] Pay-for-Elgamal-decryption-key and its application to Anonymous Credentials

2021-02-03 Thread Joe Miyamoto Philips
Hi all. I want to point out another application of Discrete-Log selling on PTLC lightning since I could not find anyone else mentioning it (in particular, I could not find in the Nadav Kohen's list here. [1] ) The protocol may be obvious to most of the members here, but I believe its