Hey Laolu,
Looks like HORNET is back in the game in many recent threads ;)
However the recent paper shared on the tor-dev mailing list [1] mentions
that HORNET and
other onion sessions might be a lot less secure than we thought...so I'd
wait for more academic
results before including such a big ch
Hi Antoine,
This delegation trades hardware requirements against privacy leaks
> and higher fees. And we also have now to re-design privacy mechanism
> to constitue an anonymous network on top of the network one. Rendez-vous
> is one of them, multipe-trampoline hops another one.
>
I'm not sure I
Hi t-bast,
> She creates a Bolt 11 invoice containing that pre-encrypted onion.
This seem insufficient, as if the prescribed route that Alice selects fails,
then the sender has no further information to go off of (let's say Teddy is
offline, but there're other pats). cdecker's rendezvous sketch u
Hi,
Design reason of trampoline routing was to avoid lite nodes having
to store the whole network graph and compute long-hop route. Trick
lays in getting away from source-base routing, which has the nice
property to hide hop position along the payment route (if we forget
payment hash correleation)
Cool: non-source rendez-vous routing. Getting closer to 2013 Amiko Pay,
with the added experience of 2019 Lightning with Sphinx routing and AMP.
https://cornwarecjp.github.io/amiko-pay/doc/amiko_draft_2.pdf
(esp. section 2.1.3)
Please forgive the use of the term "Ripple". 2013 was a different ti
Good morning everyone,
Since I'm a one-trick pony, I'd like to talk to you about...guess what?
Trampoline!
If you watched my talk at LNConf2019, I mentioned at the end that
Trampoline enables high AMP very easily.
Every Trampoline node in the route may aggregate an incoming multi-part
payment and