Re: Linux Audit Mail List

2023-10-31 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Oct 31, 2023 at 5:24 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello, > > I think the linux-audit mail list will be shutdown at midnight tonight ... Whoa, that seems rather abrupt, is the mail server being shut down? Or something else? > There are mail archives such as > >

Re: [pcmoore-audit:main 1/1] README.orig: warning: ignored by one of the .gitignore files

2023-08-31 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Aug 31, 2023 at 5:33 AM Liu, Yujie wrote: > On Wed, 2023-08-30 at 10:29 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > I have no idea if there is a person attached to any of the addresses > > on the To line above, but please send audit kernel issues to > > au...@vger.kernel.or

Re: [nf PATCH 2/2] netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log rule reset

2023-08-30 Thread Paul Moore
r: nf_tables: Introduce NFT_MSG_GETRULE_RESET") > Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > kernel/auditsc.c | 1 + > net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 18 ++ > 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) See my comments in patch 1

Re: [nf PATCH 1/2] netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log setelem reset

2023-08-30 Thread Paul Moore
out during the first few days of the merge window it might be advisable to wait more than a day or two to give the relevant maintainers a chance to review the patch. Also, as a note for future submissions, we've moved the audit kernel mailing list to au...@vger.kernel.org. Acked-by: Paul Moo

Re: [pcmoore-audit:main 1/1] README.orig: warning: ignored by one of the .gitignore files

2023-08-30 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 12:17 AM kernel test robot wrote: > tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git main > head: 94e5ef9b157c6c3779352a8d4121542f71de52a1 > commit: 94e5ef9b157c6c3779352a8d4121542f71de52a1 [1/1] audit: add a Linux > Audit specific README.md and

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-26 Thread Paul Moore
On August 26, 2023 2:38:55 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: On 2023/08/25 12:36, Paul Moore wrote: It is unfortunate that you continue ignoring the How can auditd generate logs that are not triggered via syscalls? line. I know how to configure syscall rules using "-S" option. But I do no

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-24 Thread Paul Moore
On August 24, 2023 6:24:47 PM Tetsuo Handa wrote: On 2023/08/24 23:26, Paul Moore wrote: On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:47 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: On 2023/08/24 22:39, Tetsuo Handa wrote: (1) Catch _all_ process creations (both via fork()/clone() system calls and kthread_create() from the kernel

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-24 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 11:55 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Thursday, August 24, 2023 9:30:10 AM EDT Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:21 AM Tetsuo Handa > > wrote: > > > On 2023/08/23 23:48, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > We've already discussed this

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-24 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:47 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/24 22:39, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > >>> (1) Catch _all_ process creations (both via fork()/clone() system calls > >>> and > >>> kthread_create() from the kernel), and duplicate the history upon > >>> process > >>>

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-24 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:39 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/24 22:30, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:21 AM Tetsuo Handa > > wrote: > >> > >> On 2023/08/23 23:48, Paul Moore wrote: > >>> We've already discussed this both fr

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-24 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Aug 24, 2023 at 9:21 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > On 2023/08/23 23:48, Paul Moore wrote: > > We've already discussed this both from a kernel load perspective (it > > should be able to handle the load, if not that is a separate problem > > to address) as well as the h

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-23 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023 at 10:18 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/22 1:35, Paul Moore wrote: > >> "auditctl -D" must not clear rules for tracing fork()/execve()/exit() > >> system calls. This is impossible because this change will break userspace > >>

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-22 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Aug 22, 2023 at 12:29 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Wednesday, August 16, 2023 9:53:58 AM EDT Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 6:10 AM Tetsuo Handa > > wrote: > > > On 2023/08/16 3:44, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-21 Thread Paul Moore
On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 3:09 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/18 23:59, Paul Moore wrote: > > Except we are not talking SELinux or LSMs here, we are talking about > > audit and the audit subsystem is very different from the LSM layer. > > The LSM layer is designed to be p

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-18 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Aug 18, 2023 at 6:30 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/16 22:53, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 6:10 AM Tetsuo Handa > > wrote: > >> On 2023/08/16 3:44, Paul Moore wrote: > >>> On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at 6:58 AM Tetsuo Handa > >&

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-16 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 6:10 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/16 3:44, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at 6:58 AM Tetsuo Handa > > wrote: > >> > >> When an unexpected system event occurs, the administrator may want to > >> identify which ap

Re: [PATCH] audit: add task history record

2023-08-15 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at 6:58 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > When an unexpected system event occurs, the administrator may want to > identify which application triggered the event. For example, unexpected > process termination is still a real concern enough to write articles > like

Re: [PATCH v2] TaskTracker : Simplified thread information tracker.

2023-08-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 6:07 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/08/08 5:13, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Aug 7, 2023 at 3:03 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > >> On Monday, August 7, 2023 2:53:40 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote: > >>> On Sun, Aug 6, 2023 at 9:05 AM Tetsuo Handa &

Re: [PATCH v2] TaskTracker : Simplified thread information tracker.

2023-08-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Aug 7, 2023 at 3:03 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Monday, August 7, 2023 2:53:40 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 6, 2023 at 9:05 AM Tetsuo Handa > > > > wrote: > > > When an unexpected system event occurs, the administrator may want to > > &g

Re: [PATCH v2] TaskTracker : Simplified thread information tracker.

2023-08-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Sun, Aug 6, 2023 at 9:05 AM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > > When an unexpected system event occurs, the administrator may want to > identify which application triggered the event. For example, unexpected > process termination is still a real concern enough to write articles > like

Re: Comprehensive Documentation on the Linux Audit Framework

2023-06-06 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 3:09 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Tuesday, June 6, 2023 6:31:55 PM EDT Vincent Abraham wrote: > > Thanks. Could you also point to portions in the codebase where these > > functions are called for monitoring file access? > > I'll let Richard or Paul point to the place in the

Re: Auditd doesn't receive syscalls after installation for the current shell.

2023-05-24 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 10:46 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Wednesday, May 24, 2023 7:37:27 AM EDT Rinat Gadelshin wrote: > > Hello there. > > > > It seems that the kernel doesn't send messages for syscalls of the shell > > process from which auditd is installed. > > > > Reproducing steps (performed

Re: Can AUDIT_LIST_RULES causes kthreadd-spam?

2023-05-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 10:50 PM Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2023/05/04 7:12, Rinat Gadelshin wrote: > > On 04.05.2023 00:27, Paul Moore wrote: > >> Can you be more specific about the kernel threads you are seeing, are > >> you seeing multiple "kauditd" threads

Re: Can AUDIT_LIST_RULES causes kthreadd-spam?

2023-05-03 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 5:14 PM Rinat Gadelshin wrote: > Hello there =) > > My name is Rinat. > I'm a newbie here (at Linux kernel developer community). > > My current job is to work with audit subsystem on different > versions of Linux (and different kernel versions from 3.10 to the latest) >

Re: Re: "service auditd start" fails inside a container

2023-04-28 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Apr 28, 2023 at 8:25 AM 江杨 wrote: > > May I ask if Auditd supports Docker? Thank you > https://listman.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-July/msg00078.html Have you tried the configuration changes suggested in the mailing list post you linked above? -- paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface

2023-04-17 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 5:18 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 04:16:29PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 2:06???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 02:45:07PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 7:

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface

2023-04-17 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 2:06 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 02:45:07PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 7:36???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 05:45:41PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface

2023-04-13 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 7:36 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 05:45:41PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:10???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:04:42PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:

Re: small patch for issue with rules that have been (incorrecly) copied from Windows

2023-04-13 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 12:25 PM Carlos De Avillez wrote: > > Hello again, > > Just checking is there is interest in the below. I noticed that your email ended up in my spam folder, likely because it was not plaintext, but who knows for sure. You might want to try posting your patch as a GitHub

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support

2023-04-12 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 2:05 PM Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 12:11 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > On Monday, January 30, 2023 5:57:22 PM EST Fan Wu wrote: ... > > > audit: MAC_POLICY_LOAD policy_name="dmverity_roothash" > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support

2023-04-12 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Mar 16, 2023 at 6:53 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:05:33PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 12:11???PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > On Monday, January 30, 2023 5:57:22 PM

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface

2023-04-12 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:10 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:04:42PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > > > > From: Deven Bowers > > > > > > As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses sec

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider

2023-04-11 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 2:53 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:03:11PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > > > > From: Deven Bowers > > > > > > IPE must have a centralized function to evaluat

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser

2023-04-11 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Apr 6, 2023 at 4:00 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:02:32PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58???PM Fan Wu wrote: > > > > > > From: Deven Bowers > > > > > > IPE's interpretation of the what the user tr

Re: Help with setting up Auditd kernel repository

2023-03-20 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 11:09 AM Anurag Aggarwal wrote: > > > > Can you be more specific about the exact repository? There is a > > repository which contains the development code for the Linux Kernel's > > audit subsystem, and there is a second repository which contains > > Steve's audit

Re: Help with setting up Auditd kernel repository

2023-03-20 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 8:20 AM Anurag Aggarwal wrote: > > Hello All, > > Will anyone help me with some documentation on how to build and test > auditd-kernel repository? Can you be more specific about the exact repository? There is a repository which contains the development code for the Linux

Re: audit userspace problems with io_uring async ops

2023-03-17 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Mar 7, 2023 at 4:17 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello Paul, > > On Tuesday, February 28, 2023 5:04:04 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > ... if you look closely you'll notice that the #289 event (the async > > URINGOP) is missing from the ausearch output. > > Tha

Re: Auditing nftables changes

2023-03-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Mar 10, 2023 at 9:36 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > > On Thursday, March 9, 2023 5:52:28 PM EST Bruce Elrick wrote: > > Anyway, I think I need to spend some time playing until that "aha!" > > moment comes. It's feels a lot closer thanks to both of your responses > > and I really apprecaite the

Re: Auditing nftables changes

2023-03-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Mar 9, 2023 at 11:33 AM Bruce Elrick wrote: > > I think I need to clarify where I'm confused ;-) > > With iptables you could write a rule that would only catch system > calls that were for iptables changes. That is, you didn't need to > capture *all* setsockopt calls (not that there would

Re: Auditing nftables changes

2023-03-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Mar 8, 2023 at 7:13 PM Bruce Elrick wrote: > Hello all, > > I'm not sure if this list is appropriate for questions so please let > me know and otherwise ignore if this message is not appropriate. > > I'm trying to help someone who is finally migrating from iptables to > nftables on the

Re: Key based rate limiter (audit_set_rate_limit)

2023-03-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Mar 8, 2023 at 6:53 AM Anurag Aggarwal wrote: >> Limiting of audit records is actually done in the kernel, and >> currently the rate limit applies equally[1] to all records, there is >> no ability to enforce limits per-key. > > One question Paul, will it be ok, if we contribute something

Re: audit userspace problems with io_uring async ops

2023-03-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Mar 7, 2023 at 4:17 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello Paul, > > On Tuesday, February 28, 2023 5:04:04 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > ... if you look closely you'll notice that the #289 event (the async > > URINGOP) is missing from the ausearch output. > > Tha

Re: audit userspace problems with io_uring async ops

2023-03-06 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Mar 6, 2023 at 3:58 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello Paul, > > On Monday, March 6, 2023 3:07:37 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 5:04 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > > > We just recently started picking up a

Re: audit userspace problems with io_uring async ops

2023-03-06 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 5:04 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > Hi all, > > We just recently started picking up audit-testsuite failures with the > latest upstream kernels and I tracked it down to a change in how the > IORING_OP_OPENAT operation is handled, and how Steve's audit userspac

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 12:11 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello, > > On Monday, January 30, 2023 5:57:22 PM EST Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > > > Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, > > allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through > its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust > provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to >

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy > authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their > programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS > be reported. > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > block_device structures can have valuable security properties, > based on how they are created, and what subsystem manages them. > > By adding LSM storage to this structure, this data can be accessed > at the LSM layer. > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with > userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective > inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under > admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst > >

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > IPE must have a centralized function to evaluate incoming callers > against IPE's policy. This iteration of the policy against the rules > for that specific caller is known as the evaluation loop. > > In addition, IPE is

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Feb 10, 2023 at 6:21 PM Fan Wu wrote: > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 04:49:44PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On Mon, 2023-01-30 at 14:57 -0800, Fan Wu wrote: > > > From: Deven Bowers > > > > > > IPE must have a centralized function to evaluate incoming callers > > > against IPE's policy.

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm

2023-03-04 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu wrote: > > From: Deven Bowers > > Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an > complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs > today. > > Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource >

Re: Key based rate limiter (audit_set_rate_limit)

2023-03-02 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 12:24 PM Lenny Bruzenak wrote: > On 3/1/23 22:13, Anurag Aggarwal wrote: >> >> Or if selinux is in force, create policy for the events you definitely want, >> then look for those types (either subject or object) in your rule. This is >> something I've seen before, where

audit userspace problems with io_uring async ops

2023-02-28 Thread Paul Moore
Hi all, We just recently started picking up audit-testsuite failures with the latest upstream kernels and I tracked it down to a change in how the IORING_OP_OPENAT operation is handled, and how Steve's audit userspace displays async io_uring ops. It appears that when ausearch is used to look for

Re: Key based rate limiter (audit_set_rate_limit)

2023-02-28 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 10:35 AM Anurag Aggarwal wrote: > > Hello Paul, > > Thank you for your information. > >> If you have a particular audit >> rule which is too verbose *and* you are willing to lose audit records >> from that filter rule (which is what would happen if they were rate >>

Re: Key based rate limiter (audit_set_rate_limit)

2023-02-28 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 5:53 AM Anurag Aggarwal wrote: > Hello All, > > The current rate limiter, audit_set_rate_limit limits all types of events. In > our case, we want to limit auditd events with a specific key, as they are > very noisy and consume very high CPU. > > From my understanding,

[GIT PULL] Audit patches for v6.3

2023-02-20 Thread Paul Moore
(2023-02-07 10:22:29 -0500) audit/stable-6.3 PR 20230220 Paul Moore (1): audit: update the mailing list in MAINTAINERS MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion

Re: [PATCH] tests/filter_exclude: euid filtering now possible in exclude filter

2023-02-14 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 14, 2023 at 2:23 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > Starting with Steve's audit userspace v3.1, an euid exclude filter no > longer results in an error. Adjust the test accordingly. > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore > --- > tests/filter_exclude/test | 2 +- > 1 file ch

[PATCH] tests/filter_exclude: euid filtering now possible in exclude filter

2023-02-14 Thread Paul Moore
Starting with Steve's audit userspace v3.1, an euid exclude filter no longer results in an error. Adjust the test accordingly. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- tests/filter_exclude/test | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/filter_exclude/test b/tests

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Feb 10, 2023 at 5:00 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-02-10 11:52, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 10, 2023 at 11:00 AM Jens Axboe wrote: > > > On 2/10/23 8:39?AM, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 7:15 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Feb 10, 2023 at 11:00 AM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 2/10/23 8:39?AM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 7:15 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >> On 2/9/23 3:54?PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > >>> On Thursday, February 9, 2023 5:37:22 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > &g

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 7:15 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 2/9/23 3:54 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > > On Thursday, February 9, 2023 5:37:22 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > >> On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 4:53 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > >>> On 2023-02-01 16:18, Paul Moore wrote: &

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 5:54 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Thursday, February 9, 2023 5:37:22 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 4:53 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > On 2023-02-01 16:18, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 3:34

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 4:53 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-02-01 16:18, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 3:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > fadvise and madvise both provide hints for caching or access pattern for > > > file and memo

Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] fanotify: Allow user space to pass back additional audit info

2023-02-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 12:37 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-02-08 11:24, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 10:27 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > > > On Wednesday, February 8, 2023 10:03:24 AM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2

Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] fanotify: Allow user space to pass back additional audit info

2023-02-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 10:27 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Wednesday, February 8, 2023 10:03:24 AM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 7:08 AM Jan Kara wrote: > > > On Tue 07-02-23 09:54:11, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 7:09 AM Jan Ka

Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] fanotify: Allow user space to pass back additional audit info

2023-02-08 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 7:08 AM Jan Kara wrote: > On Tue 07-02-23 09:54:11, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 7:09 AM Jan Kara wrote: > > > On Fri 03-02-23 16:35:13, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > The Fanotify API can be used for access control by reque

Re: [PATCH] audit: update the mailing list in MAINTAINERS

2023-02-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 1:44 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > We've moved the upstream Linux Kernel audit subsystem discussions to > a new mailing list, this patch updates the MAINTAINERS info with the > new list address. > > Marking this for stable inclusion to help speed uptake of the

[PATCH] audit: update the mailing list in MAINTAINERS

2023-02-07 Thread Paul Moore
so the risk should be close to nil. Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 7f86d02cb427..b686c3af313f 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3511,7 +3511,7

Re: Upstream kernel development and the linux-audit mailing list

2023-02-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Feb 3, 2023 at 11:39 AM Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 2:44 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > > > Hello all, > > ... > > > I'll hold off on list creation for a couple of days in case anyone has > > a well reasoned argument against moving upstream

Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] fanotify: Allow user space to pass back additional audit info

2023-02-07 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 7:09 AM Jan Kara wrote: > On Fri 03-02-23 16:35:13, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > The Fanotify API can be used for access control by requesting permission > > event notification. The user space tooling that uses it may have a > > complicated policy that inherently contains

Re: Upstream kernel development and the linux-audit mailing list

2023-02-03 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 2:44 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > Hello all, ... > I'll hold off on list creation for a couple of days in case anyone has > a well reasoned argument against moving upstream kernel development to > a new list. However, I want to underscore that any a

Re: [PATCH v2] io_uring,audit: don't log IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-02-01 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 3:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > fadvise and madvise both provide hints for caching or access pattern for > file and memory respectively. Skip them. You forgot to update the first sentence in the commit description :/ I'm still looking for some type of statement

Upstream kernel development and the linux-audit mailing list

2023-01-31 Thread Paul Moore
Hello all, Those of you who have been following the linux-audit mailing list closely over the past several years have likely seen some issues relating to upstream Linux Kernel development and the mailing list: disagreements on the focus of the list (upstream vs upstream+distro), and a moderated

Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR

2023-01-29 Thread Paul Moore
On Sat, Jan 28, 2023 at 12:26 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Friday, January 27, 2023 5:43:02 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise. > > > > > > Su

Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates

2023-01-28 Thread Paul Moore
On Sat, Jan 28, 2023 at 11:48 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Friday, January 27, 2023 5:53:24 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:46 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > > > On 1/27/23 3:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 2:43 PM Jens Axboe

Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 6:01 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-01-27 17:43, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise. > > > > > > Suggested-by: St

Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 6:02 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 1/27/23 3:53 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:46 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >> On 1/27/23 3:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > >>> On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 2:43 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >>&

Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] io_uring, audit: audit IORING_OP_FADVISE but not IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:55 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-01-27 17:35, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > > Since FADVISE can truncate files and MADVISE operates on memory, reverse > > > th

Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] io_uring, audit: audit IORING_OP_FADVISE but not IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:45 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 1/27/23 3:35?PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > >> > >> Since FADVISE can truncate files and MADVISE operates on memory, reverse > >> the audit_skip

Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:46 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 1/27/23 3:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 2:43 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >> On 1/27/23 12:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > >>> On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:40 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >>>

Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise. > > Suggested-by: Steve Grubb > Fixes: a56834e0fafe ("io_uring: add fgetxattr and getxattr support") > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > io_uring/opdef.c | 2 ++

Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 2:43 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 1/27/23 12:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:40 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > >> On 1/27/23 10:23 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > >>> A couple of updates to the iouring ops aud

Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] io_uring, audit: audit IORING_OP_FADVISE but not IORING_OP_MADVISE

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Since FADVISE can truncate files and MADVISE operates on memory, reverse > the audit_skip tags. > > Fixes: 5bd2182d58e9 ("audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to > io_uring") > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- >

Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] fanotify,audit: Allow audit to use the full permission event response

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 5:11 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > On 2023-01-20 13:58, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 4:14 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > > This patch passes the full response so that the audit function can use all > > >

Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] fanotify,audit: Allow audit to use the full permission event response

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 5:06 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-01-20 13:52, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 1:34 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > > Hello Richard, > > > > > > I built a new kernel and tested this with old and new user space. It is &

Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates

2023-01-27 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:40 PM Jens Axboe wrote: > On 1/27/23 10:23 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > A couple of updates to the iouring ops audit bypass selections suggested in > > consultation with Steve Grubb. > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (2): > > io_uring,audit: audit IORING_OP_FADVISE but

Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] fanotify,audit: Allow audit to use the full permission event response

2023-01-20 Thread Paul Moore
e of fanotify info that is defined is an audit > rule number, but convert it to hex encoding to future-proof the field. > Hex encoding suggested by Paul Moore . > > The {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}, corresponding to no, yes, unknown. > > Sample records: > type=FANOTIFY msg=audit

Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] fanotify,audit: Allow audit to use the full permission event response

2023-01-20 Thread Paul Moore
On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 1:34 PM Steve Grubb wrote: > > Hello Richard, > > I built a new kernel and tested this with old and new user space. It is > working as advertised. The only thing I'm wondering about is why we have 3F > as the default value when no additional info was sent? Would it be

Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] bpf: restore the ebpf program ID for BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD and PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD

2023-01-10 Thread Paul Moore
On Tue, Jan 10, 2023 at 4:10 AM Jiri Olsa wrote: > On Fri, Jan 06, 2023 at 10:43:59AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > When changing the ebpf program put() routines to support being called > > from within IRQ context the program ID was reset to zero prior to > > calling the

Re: New bug in Audit

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 10:59 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Friday, January 6, 2023 3:33:18 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > > This mailing list is *focused* on upstream work and support, and while > > > it does not preclude talking about distro specific bugs, I believe > >

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] bpf: remove the do_idr_lock parameter from bpf_prog_free_id()

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 12:58 PM wrote: > On 01/09, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 2:45 PM Stanislav Fomichev wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 7:44 AM Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > > > It was determined that th

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] bpf: remove the do_idr_lock parameter from bpf_prog_free_id()

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 2:45 PM Stanislav Fomichev wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 7:44 AM Paul Moore wrote: > > > > It was determined that the do_idr_lock parameter to > > bpf_prog_free_id() was not necessary as it should always be true. > > > > Suggeste

Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] bpf: restore the ebpf program ID for BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD and PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 2:45 PM Stanislav Fomichev wrote: > On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 7:44 AM Paul Moore wrote: > > > > When changing the ebpf program put() routines to support being called > > from within IRQ context the program ID was reset to zero prior to > > calli

Re: A question on monitoring time or time management changes in the kernel and the adjtimex system call

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 2:33 AM Burn Alting wrote: > > All, > > Would it be correct to say that when one sees an adjtimex system call audit > event, a change has occurred ONLY if either a AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL (algorithm > change) or AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET (time change) record is present in the

Re: New bug in Audit

2023-01-09 Thread Paul Moore
On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 3:30 AM Ariel Silver wrote: > > Hey guys and thank you for the quick reply, Much appreciated! > > As Richard and Steve mentioned the commit: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/commit/1b2263a807ca651f94517b1b22dc5f13e494984d > Fixed this issue. A quick note for

Re: New bug in Audit

2023-01-06 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 2:32 PM Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 11:32 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > > On Thursday, January 5, 2023 10:41:49 AM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 8:38 AM Ariel Silver > > wrote: > > > > I found the follo

[PATCH v3 1/2] bpf: restore the ebpf program ID for BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD and PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD

2023-01-06 Thread Paul Moore
erations with the associated audit state (other audit records). Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d809e134be7a ("bpf: Prepare bpf_prog_put() to be called from irq context.") Reported-by: Burn Alting Reported-by: Jiri Olsa Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov S

[PATCH v3 2/2] bpf: remove the do_idr_lock parameter from bpf_prog_free_id()

2023-01-06 Thread Paul Moore
It was determined that the do_idr_lock parameter to bpf_prog_free_id() was not necessary as it should always be true. Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- * v3 - initial draft --- include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 20 ++-- 2 files

Re: New bug in Audit

2023-01-05 Thread Paul Moore
On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 11:32 AM Steve Grubb wrote: > On Thursday, January 5, 2023 10:41:49 AM EST Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 5, 2023 at 8:38 AM Ariel Silver > wrote: > > > I found the following bug: > > > > > > OS version = Red Hat Enterprise Linux r

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