On Thu, 18 Oct 2018, Pavel Machek wrote:
Definitely should be refined.
Meltdowns approach AFAIK does not work because reads outside the enclave
will always have a predefined value (-1) but only if the page is present,
which was later exploited in the Foreshadow attack.
What about L1tf and http
On Thu 2018-10-18 02:45:27, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, 15 Oct 2018, Pavel Machek wrote:
> >On Tue 2018-09-25 16:06:56, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >>+Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications
> >>to
> >>+set aside private regions of code and data. The code outsi
On 10/15/2018 01:54 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
>> +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications
>> to
>> +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is
>> +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access
>> control.
>>
On Mon, 15 Oct 2018, Pavel Machek wrote:
On Tue 2018-09-25 16:06:56, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
+Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to
+set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is
+disallowed to access the memory inside the encl
On Tue 2018-09-25 16:06:56, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Documentation of the features of the Software Guard eXtensions used
> by the Linux kernel and basic design choices for the core and driver
> and functionality.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_
On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 16:06:56 +0300
Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Documentation of the features of the Software Guard eXtensions used
> by the Linux kernel and basic design choices for the core and driver
> and functionality.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
> ---
> Documentation/index.rst
Documentation of the features of the Software Guard eXtensions used
by the Linux kernel and basic design choices for the core and driver
and functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
---
Documentation/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst | 185 ++
