Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
generation.
The naming of _RSA_I2OSP and the variables used in
This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi
---
kernel/power/snapshot.c |6 ++
1
This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
v3:
- Change the naming of SIG_LENG to SIG_LEN
- Extracts the code of signature generation code from copy_data_
Implement Octet String to Integer conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.2] in rsa.c. It's
the second step of signature generation operation.
This patch is temporary set non-RSASP1 message to pks->S for debugging.
The naming of RSA_OS2IP and the variables used in this function accord PKCS#1
spec but not follo
Introduced a hibernate_key.c file to query the key pair from EFI variables
and maintain key pair for check signature of S4 snapshot image. We
loaded the private key when snapshot image stored success.
This patch introduced 2 EFI variables for store the key to sign S4 image and
verify signature whe
Implement RSASP1 and fill-in the following data to public key signature
structure: signature length (pkcs->k), signature octet
strings (pks->S) and MPI of signature (pks->rsa.s).
The naming of RSASP1 and the variables used in this function accord PKCS#1
spec but not follow kernel naming convention
We will not direct fail the hibernate snapshot restore when the
signature check fail, instead kernel will complain by warning
message and taint kernel.
This patch also introduced a sig_enforce flag to indicate if we want
direct fail the snapshot restore when signature check fail. User can
enable i
Add generate_signature interface on signature.c, asymmetric-subtype and
rsa.c for prepare to implement signature generation.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/private_key.h | 29 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c |
Add ASN.1 files and parser to support parsing PKCS #8 noncompressed private
key information. It's better than direct parsing pure private key because
PKCS #8 has a privateKeyAlgorithm to indicate the algorithm of private
key, e.g. RSA from PKCS #1
v2:
- Removed bitfield declare of privkey_algo in
Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in
its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a
pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has
risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's scope,
Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
first step of signature generation operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
This patch is temporary set emLen to pks->k, and temporary set EM to
pks->S for debugging. We will replace the above values to real signature
after implement
This patch introduced SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config, enable this
option let kernel notify booloader (e.g. shim) to regenerate key-pair of
snapshot verification for each hibernate.
Kernel loaded S4 sign key in efi stub, so the private key forward from
efi bootloader to kernel in UEFI secure env
Show the verification time for monitor the performance of SHA256 and RSA
verification.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi
---
kernel/power/snapshot.c |7 +++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.
This patch introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for user to select which
hash algorithm will be used during signature generation of snapshot.
v2:
Add define check of oCONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION in snapshot.c before
declare pkey_hash().
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi
---
Base on Matthew Garrett's 2 patches in
"[PATCH] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted"
series
[PATCH 01/10] Add secure_modules() call
[PATCH V3 11/11] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when
in Secure Boot mode
This patch introduced EFI_SECURE_BO
Hi experts,
This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate
snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader
generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to kernel
for sign/verify S4 image.
Due to there have potential threat fr
On 09/14/13 00:37, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
On 09/13/2013 08:37 AM, Arend van Spriel wrote:
I need to obtain a uefi variable so I went looking at the API in
include/linux/efi.h. I found the following definition:
But according to the specs the variable I need to obtain is 2k bytes.
Should I expect
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