RE: [PATCH v2 0/8] Decode IA32/X64 CPER

2018-03-01 Thread Luck, Tony
> One much more important thing I forgot about yesterday: how is > this thing playing into our RAS reporting, x86 decoding chain, etc > infrastructure? > > Is CPER bypassing it completely and the firmware is doing everything > now? I sure hope not. Intel gives OEMs lots of options to catch and twe

Re: linux-next: UEFI Secure boot lockdown patchset

2018-03-01 Thread Stephen Rothwell
Hi David, On Thu, 01 Mar 2018 11:06:55 + David Howells wrote: > > Can you pull the following branch into linux-next please? It does three > things: > > (1) It restricts various accesses userspace may make upon the kernel when the > kernel is locked down. > > (2) It engages the lockd

Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Decode IA32/X64 CPER

2018-03-01 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 08:58:15PM +, Ghannam, Yazen wrote: > 1) We keep this set mostly as-is. This would be our fallback if we don't have > anything better. Yes, sounds good. We try to decode it as MCE and if we cannot, we dump the raw CPER record. > 2) I add the MCA decoding to this set. I

Re: linux-next: UEFI Secure boot lockdown patchset

2018-03-01 Thread David Howells
I forgot to include the branch URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=efi-lock-down Thanks for spotting that, Ard! David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.o

Re: linux-next: UEFI Secure boot lockdown patchset

2018-03-01 Thread Ard Biesheuvel
Hi David, On 1 March 2018 at 11:06, David Howells wrote: > > Hi Stephen, > > Can you pull the following branch into linux-next please? Could you please include a URL? > It does three > things: > > (1) It restricts various accesses userspace may make upon the kernel when the > kernel is l

linux-next: UEFI Secure boot lockdown patchset

2018-03-01 Thread David Howells
Hi Stephen, Can you pull the following branch into linux-next please? It does three things: (1) It restricts various accesses userspace may make upon the kernel when the kernel is locked down. (2) It engages the lockdown if UEFI Secure Boot mode is detected. (3) It passes the UEFI Sec