Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

2018-04-04 Thread Eric W. Biederman
David Howells writes: > Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> As far as I can tell, what's really going on here is that there's a >> significant contingent here that wants to prevent Linux from >> chainloading something that isn't Linux. > > You have completely the wrong end of the stick. No one has said

Re: [PATCH] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files

2018-02-22 Thread Eric W. Biederman
"Luck, Tony" writes: >> - add a per-user mutex, and do the usleep inside of it, so that >> anybody who tries to do a thousand threads will just be serialized by >> the mutex. >> >> Note that the mutex needs to be per-user, because otherwise it will be >> a DoS for the other users. > > I can try

Re: Use PCI ROMs from EFI boot services

2012-12-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 04:15:56PM -0800, Yinghai Lu wrote: > >> at the same time we should export setup_data into /sys, so kexec could >> append this pointer to command of >> second kernel, just like kexec append acpi_rsdp. >> That should address DavidW's concern. > > W

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 07:36:32PM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> For automated installs you don't have to satisfy me. Feel free to >> deliver a lousy solution to your users. Just don't use your arbitrary >> design decisi

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 06:46:32PM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Matthew Garrett writes: >> >> > On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 11:16:12AM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> Matthew Garrett writes: >> >> > No,

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 11:16:12AM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Matthew Garrett writes: >> > No, in the general case the system will do that once it fails to find a >> > bootable OS on the drive. >> >> In the general

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Sun, Nov 04, 2012 at 11:24:17PM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> "H. Peter Anvin" writes: >> > >> > That is a hugely different thing from needing a console. >> >> Not at all. >> >> In the general cas

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-05 Thread Eric W. Biederman
"H. Peter Anvin" writes: > This is not a good thing to assume. A vendor could have an external > button, for example. Facts are always a good thing to assume. The fact is the general case does not admit an install without user interaction. It makes a lot of sense to revisit the working assump

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-04 Thread Eric W. Biederman
"H. Peter Anvin" writes: > On 11/05/2012 07:14 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> In any case the notion that unattended install with no user interaction >> on any uefi machine in any state is complete and total rubbish. It >> can't be don

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-04 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Jiri Kosina writes: > On Fri, 2 Nov 2012, Vivek Goyal wrote: > >> > With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an >> > unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to >> > load unsigned images. >> >> Yep, good in theory. Now that basically means reimplementi

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-04 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Sun, Nov 04, 2012 at 09:14:47AM +, James Bottomley wrote: > >> I've actually had more than enough experience with automated installs >> over my career: they're either done by paying someone or using a >> provisioning system. In either case, they provision a stati

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-02 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 03:03:02PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run >> windows. Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key? > > There's no rea

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-02 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps. >> Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these >> arguments around I am

Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

2012-11-02 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Matthew Garrett writes: > On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 09:58:17PM +, Alan Cox wrote: >> On Thu, 1 Nov 2012 21:34:52 + >> Matthew Garrett wrote: >> > I think you've misunderstood. Blacklist updates are append only. >> >> I think you've misunderstood - thats a technical detail that merely >> a