osed one was
braindead and wouldn't work) might be the best option here, I might spin
up a patch this weekend.
Presumably this is also an issue with the old EFI vars sysfs code?
Never used that directly myself (only through efibootmgr).
Cheers,
Shea Levy
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. Simply skip such variables when making the sysfs entries
2. Come up with an escaping scheme, e.g. "a single backslash is
actually a forward slash, two backslashes are actually a single
backslash" or some such.
Thoughts?
Cheers,
Shea Levy
P.S. Here is the program I ran to get the probl
ernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/mfleming/efi.git/commit/?h=urgent&id=123abd76edf56c02a76b46d3d673897177ef067b
. It's included in the efi-for-3.9-rc2 tag, and cc'd stable.
Cheers,
Shea Levy
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the body of
Hi Matt,
On 2013-03-06 08:19, Matt Fleming wrote:
On Tue, 2013-03-05 at 17:39 +0800, Lingzhu Xiang wrote:
On 03/03/2013 02:03 AM, Andre Heider wrote:
> After a BIOS update I get this in dmesg:
>
> [0.581554] EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
> [0.584914] [ cut here ]-
On Jan 2, 2013, at 12:43, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 02, 2013 at 08:26:29AM -0500, Shea Levy wrote:
>
>> Hm, ok. Does the boot stub have access to CONFIG_CMDLINE? Or could
>> another compile-time setting be added so that distros can ship livecds
>> that au
On Jan 1, 2013, at 12:24, "H. Peter Anvin" wrote:
> On 01/01/2013 07:55 AM, Shea Levy wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In March last year, I submitted a patch to enable the EFI boot stub to
>> read its config arguments from a file on the ESP, both to help with
>&g
tside of the kernel itself, but before I started the
work I thought I'd ask here if anyone thought I should instead bring my
old patch up-to-date.
Thoughts?
Thanks,
Shea Levy
P.S. I am subscribed to linux-efi but not lkml, please include me in any
replies to lkml.
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On 11/08/2012 09:41 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Thu, Nov 08, 2012 at 03:38:33PM +0100, Thomas Renninger wrote:
BTW: Who decides what is allowed and what is not?
Tree maintainers.
I guess it should be the spec. I haven't read the details, but
when even Matthew is not sure, it sounds as if t
On 10/31/2012 01:08 PM, Alan Cox wrote:
On Wed, 31 Oct 2012 15:56:35 +
Matthew Garrett wrote:
1) Gain root.
2) Modify swap partition directly.
3) Force reboot.
4) Win.
Root should not have the ability to elevate themselves to running
arbitrary kernel code. Therefore, the above attack need
On 10/31/2012 01:03 PM, Alan Cox wrote:
On Wed, 31 Oct 2012 16:55:04 +0100 (CET)
Jiri Kosina wrote:
On Wed, 31 Oct 2012, Alan Cox wrote:
All this depends on your threat model. If I have physical access to
suspend/resume your machine then you already lost. If I don't have
physical access then
On 10/31/2012 11:02 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 03:50:00PM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
Reading stored memory image (potentially tampered before reboot) from disk
is basically DMA-ing arbitrary data over the whole RAM. I am currently not
able to imagine a scenario how this c
On 10/31/2012 10:54 AM, Josh Boyer wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
On Mon, 29 Oct 2012, Matthew Garrett wrote:
This is pretty much identical to the first patchset, but with the capability
renamed (CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) and the kexec patch dropped. If anyone wants
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