On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 07:47:00PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Jun 2007 19:24:03 -0700 John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > >
> > > so... where do we stand with this? Fundamental, irreconcilable
> > > differences over the use of pathname-based security?
> > >
> > There c
On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 07:32:45AM +0200, Nick Piggin wrote:
> I think using fsblock to drive the IO and keep the pagecache flags
> uptodate and using a btree in the filesystem to manage extents of block
> allocations wouldn't be a bad idea though. Do any filesystems actually
> do this?
Yes. XFS.
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 08:34:49AM -0400, Chris Mason wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 07:23:09PM +1000, David Chinner wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 01:55:11PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
>
> [ ... fsblocks vs extent range mapping ]
>
> > iomaps can double as range locks simply because iomaps
On Jun 27, 2007 09:14 +1000, David Chinner wrote:
> Someone on the XFs list had an interesting request - preallocated
> swap files. You can't use unwritten extents for this because
> of sys_swapon()s use of bmap() (XFS returns holes for reading
> unwritten extents), so we need a method of prealloc
On Tue, 26 Jun 2007 19:24:03 -0700 John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > so... where do we stand with this? Fundamental, irreconcilable
> > differences over the use of pathname-based security?
> >
> There certainly seems to be some differences of opinion over the use
> of pathname-b
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 04:52:02PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Jun 2007 16:07:56 -0700
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > This post contains patches to include the AppArmor application security
> > framework, with request for inclusion into -mm for wider testing.
>
> Patches 24 and 31
In AppArmor, we are interested in pathnames relative to the namespace root.
This is the same as d_path() except for the root where the search ends. Add
a function for computing the namespace-relative path.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 13 -
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> The create, lookup, and permission inode operations are all passed a
> full nameidata. This is unfortunate because in nfsd and the mqueue
> filesystem, we must instantiate a struct nameidata but cannot provide
> all of the same informatio
On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 12:59:08AM +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 12:14:00PM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > On Jun 26, 2007 17:37 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > > > I also thought another proposed flag was to determine whether mtime (and
> > > > maybe ctime) is changed wh
On Tue, 26 Jun 2007 16:07:56 -0700
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> This post contains patches to include the AppArmor application security
> framework, with request for inclusion into -mm for wider testing.
Patches 24 and 31 didn't come through.
Rolled-up diffstat (excluding 24&31):
fs/attr.c
On Tue, 2007-06-26 at 16:15 -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> To remove conditionally passing of vfsmounts to the LSM, a nameidata
> struct can be instantiated in the nfsd and mqueue filesystems. This
> however results in useless information being passed down, as not
> all fields in the nameidata
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 11:42:50AM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 26, 2007 16:15 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:52:39PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > > In XFS one of the (many) ALLOC modes is to zero existing data on allocate.
> > > For ext4 all this would mea
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:52:39PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 25, 2007 19:15 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > +#define FA_FL_DEALLOC 0x01 /* default is allocate */
> > +#define FA_FL_KEEP_SIZE0x02 /* default is extend/shrink size */
> > +#define FA_FL_DEL_DATA 0x04 /* defaul
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 11:34:13AM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 26, 2007 16:02 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:46:26PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > > Can you clarify - what is the current behaviour when ENOSPC (or some other
> > > error) is hit? Does it kee
Construct a nameidata object and pass it down to permission(), so
that we can do the proper mount flag checks there.
Note that confining nfsd with AppArmor makes no sense, and so this
patch is not necessary for AppArmor alone.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by:
Create nameidata2 struct xattr_permission so that it does not pass NULL
to permission.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c | 18 +-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/xatt
Create a nameidata2 struct in nfsd and mqueue so that vfs_create does
need to conditionally pass the vfsmnt.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c|2 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 42 +
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 06:58:10PM +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> 2) The above new patches (4/7 and 7/7) are based on the dicussion
>between Andreas Dilger and David Chinner on the mode argument,
>when later posted a man page on fallocate.
Can you include the man page in this patch set, ple
--
This post is a request for discussion on creating a second smaller
nameidata struct to eliminate conditionally passing of vfsmounts
to the LSM.
It contains a series of patches that apply on top of the AppArmor
patch series. These patches were previously post on May 14,
but received no feedba
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:46:26PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 25, 2007 20:33 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > I have not implemented FA_FL_FREE_ENOSPC and FA_ZERO_SPACE flags yet, as
> > *suggested* by Andreas in http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/6/14/323 post.
> > If it is decided that these f
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/attr.c|4 ++--
include/linux/security.h |8 ++--
se
Switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir(): this
avoids calling permission() with a NULL nameidata here.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/open.c | 16 +++-
1 file changed, 7 inserti
We cannot easily switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission()
everywhere, so fix file_permission() to not use a NULL nameidata
for the remaining users.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |8 +++-
1 f
Switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup():
this avoids calling permission() with a NULL nameidata here.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c | 13 ++---
1 file changed, 6 inser
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/Kconfig |1 +
security/Makefile |1 +
security/apparmor/Kconfig |3 ++-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/s
All the things that didn't nicely fit in a category on their own: kbuild
code, declararions and inline functions, /sys/kernel/security/apparmor
filesystem for controlling apparmor from user space, profile list
functions, locking documentation, /proc/$pid/task/$tid/attr/current
access.
Signed-off-b
Pathname matching, transition table loading, profile loading and
manipulation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/apparmor/match.c| 248 ++
security/apparmor/match.h| 83
Module parameters, LSM hooks, initialization and teardown.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 817
1 file changed, 817 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null
The underlying functions by which the AppArmor LSM hooks are implemented.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/apparmor/main.c | 1255 +++
1 file changed, 1255 insertions(+
Update kenel audit range comments to show AppArmor's registered range of
1500-1599. This range used to be reserved for LSPP but LSPP uses the
SE Linux range and the range was given to AppArmor.
Adds necessary export symbols for audit subsystem routines.
Changes audit_log_vformat to be externally v
This allows LSMs to also distinguish between file descriptor and path
access for the xattr operations. (The other relevant operations are
covered by the setattr hook.)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c
Set the LOOKUP_CONTINUE flag when checking parent permissions. This allows
permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |6 ++
1 file changed, 6 insertio
Convert the selinux sysctl pathname computation code into a standalone
function.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/sysctl.h |2 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 27 +++
security/s
Struct iattr already contains ia_file since commit cc4e69de from
Miklos (which is related to commit befc649c). Use this to pass
struct file down the setattr hooks. This allows LSMs to distinguish
operations on file descriptors from operations on paths.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL P
First, when __d_path() hits a lazily unmounted mount point, it tries to prepend
the name of the lazily unmounted dentry to the path name. It gets this wrong,
and also overwrites the slash that separates the name from the following
pathname component. This patch fixes that; if a process was in dire
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |9 +++--
fs/namei.c
The path that __d_path() computes can become slightly inconsistent when it
races with mount operations: it grabs the vfsmount_lock when traversing mount
points but immediately drops it again, only to re-grab it when it reaches the
next mount point. The result is that the filename computed is not a
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/nfsd/vfs.c |7 ---
fs/xattr.c
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 12 +++-
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 15 +-
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c| 25 ++---
i
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 16 +++-
fs/xattr.c
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/xattr.c |4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 40
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |2 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |7 ++-
fs/namei.c |
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |6 --
include/linux/security.h | 18 ++
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 12
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |3 ++-
fs/namei.c|
If we unhash the dentry before calling the security_inode_rmdir hook,
we cannot compute the file's pathname in the hook anymore. AppArmor
needs to know the filename in order to decide whether a file may be
deleted, though.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gru
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 12
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |4 +++-
fs/namei.c
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 18 +
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/stat.c|2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++
s
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h |9 ++---
sec
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h |7 +--
secur
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |4 +++-
fs/namei.c |
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |5 -
fs/namei.c |
The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |5 -
fs/namei.c
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h |8 ++--
secu
Required by a later patch that adds a struct vfsmount parameter to
notify_change().
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/ntfs/file.c |2 +-
fs/reiserfs/file.c
This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c |2 +-
include/linux/security.h |9 ++---
sec
This post contains patches to include the AppArmor application security
framework, with request for inclusion into -mm for wider testing.
These patches are currently against lkml but we will gladly rebase them
against -mm so that they will apply cleanly.
Any comments and feedback to improve imple
The vfsmount parameter must be set appropriately for files visibile
outside the kernel. Files that are only used in a filesystem (e.g.,
reiserfs xattr files) will have a NULL vfsmount.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-b
Chris Wright wrote:
> * Chris Mason ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>> I'm sure people there will have a different versions of events. The
>> one part that was discussed was if pathname based security was
>> useful, and a number of the people in the room (outside of
>> novell) said it was. Now, it
I have been working for a while on making a distributed file system
that runs on Linux to become "lease aware". I have been using
advanced versions of proposed Linux modifications that allow a file
system to have a "setlease" file operations method. My primary focus
in this work was to allow Sam
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4/arch/powerpc/kernel/sys_ppc32.c
> ===
> --- linux-2.6.22-rc4.orig/arch/powerpc/kernel/sys_ppc32.c
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4/arch/powerpc/kernel/sys_ppc32.c
> @@ -773,6 +773,13 @@ asmlinkage int compat_sys_truncat
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 12:14:00PM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 26, 2007 17:37 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > Hmm.. I am thinking of a scenario when the file system supports some
> > individual flags, but does not support a particular combination of them.
> > Just for example sake, assum
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 11:42:50AM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 26, 2007 16:15 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:52:39PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > > In XFS one of the (many) ALLOC modes is to zero existing data on allocate.
> > > For ext4 all this would mea
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 11:34:13AM -0400, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 26, 2007 16:02 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:46:26PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > > Can you clarify - what is the current behaviour when ENOSPC (or some other
> > > error) is hit? Does it kee
On Mon, 2007-06-25 at 11:27 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On Sat, 2007-06-23 at 08:45 +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > You probably want to add a big comment explaining why it's fine here.
>
> I've got this in the next set:
>
> -
> - if(IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode))
> + /*
> +
On Jun 26, 2007 09:53 -0700, Bryan Henderson wrote:
> >md/raid already works happily with different sized drives from
> >different manufacturers ...
>
> >So I still cannot see anything particularly new.
>
> As compared to md of conventional disk partitions, it brings the ability
> to create and
On 6/25/07, Christoph Hellwig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 05:08:02PM -0700, Jared Hulbert wrote:
> -memory mappable swap file (I'm not sure if this one is appropriate
> for the proposed meeting)
Please explain what this is supposed to mean.
If you have a large array of a
>md/raid already works happily with different sized drives from
>different manufacturers ...
>So I still cannot see anything particularly new.
As compared to md of conventional disk partitions, it brings the ability
to create and delete arrays without shutting down all use of the physical
disks
On Jun 26, 2007 17:37 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> Hmm.. I am thinking of a scenario when the file system supports some
> individual flags, but does not support a particular combination of them.
> Just for example sake, assume we have FA_ZERO_SPACE mode also. Now, if a
> file system supports FA_Z
On Jun 26, 2007 16:15 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:52:39PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > In XFS one of the (many) ALLOC modes is to zero existing data on allocate.
> > For ext4 all this would mean is calling ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized() on
> > each extent. For some
On Jun 26, 2007 16:02 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:46:26PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > Can you clarify - what is the current behaviour when ENOSPC (or some other
> > error) is hit? Does it keep the current fallocate() or does it free it?
>
> Currently it is left
> Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls.S
> ===
> --- linux-2.6.22-rc4.orig/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls.S 2007-06-11
> 16:16:01.0 -0700
> +++ linux-2.6.22-rc4/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls.S 2007-06-11
> 16:27:29.0
Karel Zak wrote:
(BTW, maybe we can completely remove "freq, passno" from
/proc/mounts, especially if we don't have care about compatibility
with /etc/{mtab,fstab} format. The freq and passno are always zero in
/proc/mounts).
But we do, since there are applications which use getmntent() a
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 12:35:09PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
> Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> >On Sun, Jun 24, 2007 at 06:23:45AM +0200, Nick Piggin wrote:
> >
> >>I'd just like to take the chance also to ask about a VM/FS meetup some
> >>time around kernel summit (maybe take a big of time during UKUUG
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 07:23:09PM +1000, David Chinner wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 01:55:11PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
[ ... fsblocks vs extent range mapping ]
> iomaps can double as range locks simply because iomaps are
> expressions of ranges within the file. Seeing as you can only
> ac
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 01:07:43PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
> Neil Brown wrote:
> >On Tuesday June 26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> >>Chris Mason wrote:
> >>
> >>>The block device pagecache isn't special, and certainly isn't that much
> >>>code. I would suggest keeping it buffer head specific a
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:56:25PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 25, 2007 19:20 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > @@ -2499,7 +2500,8 @@ long ext4_fallocate(struct inode *inode,
> > * currently supporting (pre)allocate mode for extent-based
> > * files _only_
> > */
> > - if
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 07:23:09PM +1000, David Chinner wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 01:55:11PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
> > >
> > >Realistically, this is not about "filesystem blocks", this is
> > >about file offset to disk blocks. i.e. it's a mapping.
> >
> > Yeah, fsblock ~= the layer betw
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:52:39PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 25, 2007 19:15 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > +#define FA_FL_DEALLOC 0x01 /* default is allocate */
> > +#define FA_FL_KEEP_SIZE0x02 /* default is extend/shrink size */
> > +#define FA_FL_DEL_DATA 0x04 /* defaul
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:46:26PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> On Jun 25, 2007 20:33 +0530, Amit K. Arora wrote:
> > I have not implemented FA_FL_FREE_ENOSPC and FA_ZERO_SPACE flags yet, as
> > *suggested* by Andreas in http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/6/14/323 post.
> > If it is decided that these f
On Tue, Jun 26, 2007 at 01:55:11PM +1000, Nick Piggin wrote:
> David Chinner wrote:
> >On Sun, Jun 24, 2007 at 03:45:28AM +0200, Nick Piggin wrote:
> >>I'm announcing "fsblock" now because it is quite intrusive and so I'd
> >>like to get some thoughts about significantly changing this core part
> >
On 2007-06-25T17:14:11, Pavel Machek <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Actually, I surprised Lars a lot by telling him ln /etc/shadow /tmp/
> allows any user to make AA ineffective on large part of systems -- in
> internal discussion. (It is not actually a _bug_, but it is certainly
> unexpected).
Pav
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 03:00:15PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
> Please check if the following modified patch meets the requirements.
>
> It augments /proc/mount with additional information to
> (1) disambiguate bind mounts with subroot information.
> (2) display shared-subtree information u
89 matches
Mail list logo