Properly manage the 3 queues of sb->s_dirty/s_io/s_more_io so that
- time-ordering of dirtied_when can be easily maintained
- writeback can continue from where previous run left out
The majority work has been done by Andrew Morton and Ken Chen,
this patch just clarifies the roles o
Two function renames:
- rename redirty_tail() to queue_dirty_inode()
- rename requeue_io() to queue_for_more_io()
Also some code cleanups on fs-writeback.c. No behavior changes.
Cc: Ken Chen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <[EM
It helps catch bugs like this:
[ 738.645689] fs/fs-writeback.c:535: s_dirty got screwed up
[ 738.646114] 8100028532b0:4295082249
[ 738.646255] 810002856858:4295082259
[ 738.646388] 810002831b58:4295082667
[ 738.646520] 81000281b1b0:4295082671
[ 738.646651] 81000281d798:42
NTFS's if-condition on dirty inodes is not complete.
Fix it with sb_has_dirty_inodes().
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Ken Chen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
--- linux-2.6.23-rc1-mm2.orig/fs/ntfs/super.
Andrew,
I'd like to propose a cleaner way of using the s_dirty, s_io, s_more_io
queues for the writeback of dirty inodes. The basic idea is to clearly
define the function of the queues, especially to decouple s_diry from
s_io/s_more_io. The details are in the changelog of patch 2.
The patches ar
> >> > This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fsetattr
> >> > semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
> >> > to "silly-renaming".
> >>
> >> How do you plan to do that?
> >
> > Easy: the SFTP protocol has stateful opens and defines an FSTAT call.
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Adrian Bunk writes:
> On Thu, Aug 09, 2007 at 10:38:18PM -0400, Erez Zadok wrote:
> > I'm getting an error modprobing jffs2 due to mtdsuper failing to insmod:
> >...
> > Does anyone know what am I missing?
>
> You miss that 2.6.23-rc2 with this bug fixed has already
On Thu, Aug 09, 2007 at 10:38:18PM -0400, Erez Zadok wrote:
> I'm getting an error modprobing jffs2 due to mtdsuper failing to insmod:
>...
> Does anyone know what am I missing?
You miss that 2.6.23-rc2 with this bug fixed has already been released.
> Thanks,
> Erez.
cu
Adrian
--
"Is t
I'm getting an error modprobing jffs2 due to mtdsuper failing to insmod:
# modprobe jffs2
WARNING: Error inserting mtdsuper
(/lib/modules/2.6.23-rc1/kernel/drivers/mtd/mtdsuper.ko):
Unknown symbol in module, or unknown parameter (see dmesg)
FATAL: Error inserting jffs2
(/lib/modules/2.6.23-rc1/ker
On Aug 8 2007 18:28, Michal Piotrowski wrote:
>
>Hi Brian,
>
>Brian J. Murrell pisze:
>> I am using Ubuntu Gutsy, which is the in-development branch heading for
>> their next stable release.
>
>You forgot about message subject, so no one has read this report.
Actually, given the volume on LKML, a
Bodo Eggert wrote:
> Warning: I'm only looking at the patch.
>
> You are supposed to print an error message for a user, not to write in a
> chat window to a 1337 script kiddie. OK, you just matched the current style,
> and your patch is IMHO OK for a quick security fix, but:
>
> - Security fixes
Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> > This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fsetattr
>> > semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
>> > to "silly-renaming".
>>
>> How do you plan to do that?
>
> Easy: the SFTP protocol has stateful open
Eric Sandeen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This attempts to address CVE-2006-6058
> http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6058
>
> first reported at http://projects.info-pull.com/mokb/MOKB-17-11-2006.html
>
> Essentially a corrupted minix dir inode reporting a very large
> i_siz
Perhaps this is simpler, and preferable. Thanks to adilger for
reminding me about printk_ratelimit. :)
This attempts to address CVE-2006-6058
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6058
first reported at http://projects.info-pull.com/mokb/MOKB-17-11-2006.html
Essentiall
--- James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, 9 Aug 2007, David Howells wrote:
>
> > James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > David, I've looked at the code and can't see that you need to access the
> > > label itself outside the LSM. Could you instead simply pass the inode
> > From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> > Add a new filesystem flag, that results in the VFS not checking if the
> > current process has enough privileges to do an mknod().
> >
> > This is needed on filesystems, where an unprivileged user may be able
> > to create a device node, withou
On Thu, 9 August 2007 01:01:26 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Wednesday 08 August 2007, Jörn Engel wrote:
> > +config LOGFS
> > + bool "Log Filesystem (EXPERIMENTAL)"
> > + depends on MTD && BLOCK && EXPERIMENTAL
>
> The dependency on MTD _and_ BLOCK looks correct for your code, but
On Thu, 9 August 2007 00:56:29 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Wednesday 08 August 2007, Jörn Engel wrote:
> > +++ linux-2.6.21logfs/include/linux/logfs.h 2007-08-08
> > 02:57:37.0 +0200
> > @@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
> > +/*
> > + * fs/logfs/logfs.h
> > + *
>
> The comment does not match the
On Thu, 9 Aug 2007, David Howells wrote:
> James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > David, I've looked at the code and can't see that you need to access the
> > label itself outside the LSM. Could you instead simply pass the inode
> > pointer around?
>
> It's not quite that simple. I ne
Quoting [EMAIL PROTECTED] ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Add a new filesystem flag, that results in the VFS not checking if the
> current process has enough privileges to do an mknod().
>
> This is needed on filesystems, where an unprivileged user may be able
On Thu, 2007-08-09 at 19:52 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Trond Myklebust <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Dang, that's a lot of inlines... AFAICS, approx half of fs/nfs/fscache.h
> > should really be moved into fscache.c.
>
> If you wish. It seems a shame since a lot of them have only one calle
> > Instead, feel free to update the text-based mount interface (which can
> > be found in 2.6.23-rc1 and later).
I presume you're referring to nfs_mount_option_tokens[] and friends. Is there
a mount program that can drive this?
David
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
On Thu, 9 Aug 2007, David Howells wrote:
> + u32 (*inode_get_secid)(struct inode *inode);
To maintain API consistency, please return an int which only acts as an
error code, and returning the secid via a *u32 function parameter.
- James
--
James Morris
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
-
To unsubscribe
James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> David, I've looked at the code and can't see that you need to access the
> label itself outside the LSM. Could you instead simply pass the inode
> pointer around?
It's not quite that simple. I need to impose *two* security labels in
cachefiles_begin_s
Trond Myklebust <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Dang, that's a lot of inlines... AFAICS, approx half of fs/nfs/fscache.h
> should really be moved into fscache.c.
If you wish. It seems a shame since a lot of them have only one caller.
> > + /* we can do this here as the bits are only set with the
On Thu, 9 Aug 2007, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> This is SELinux specific functionality. It should not be an LSM
> interface.
As long as the security labels are themselves not being exported to the
kernel to be used e.g. for display or transport, then I agree, and we
should avoid passing them arou
--- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > This is SELinux specific funtionality and should be done in the
> > SELinux code. You should not be adding interfaces that are SELinux
> > specific, in this case using secids instead of the LSM blob i
This attempts to address CVE-2006-6058
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6058
first reported at http://projects.info-pull.com/mokb/MOKB-17-11-2006.html
Essentially a corrupted minix dir inode reporting a very large
i_size will loop for a very long time in minix_readdir, mini
On Thu, 9 Aug 2007, David Howells wrote:
> James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > + u32 (*inode_get_secid)(struct inode *inode);
> >
> > To maintain API consistency, please return an int which only acts as an
> > error code, and returning the secid via a *u32 function parameter.
>
> D
Dang, that's a lot of inlines... AFAICS, approx half of fs/nfs/fscache.h
should really be moved into fscache.c.
Otherwise, this looks a lot less intrusive than previous patches.
See inlined comments.
On Thu, 2007-08-09 at 17:05 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> The attached patch makes it possible f
James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > + u32 (*inode_get_secid)(struct inode *inode);
>
> To maintain API consistency, please return an int which only acts as an
> error code, and returning the secid via a *u32 function parameter.
Does that apply to *all* the functions, irrespective of w
Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is SELinux specific funtionality and should be done in the
> SELinux code. You should not be adding interfaces that are SELinux
> specific, in this case using secids instead of the LSM blob interfaces.
Is using secids your only objection? Or are
Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is SELinux specific functionality. It should not be an LSM
> interface.
This is what I worked out in conjunction with the denizens of the SELinux
mailing list. What would you have me do differently? Change things like:
u32 (*act_as_sec
--- Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, 2007-08-09 at 10:07 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > --- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained by the CacheFiles module.
> This
> > > is
> > > then used as the SID with which file
On Thu, 2007-08-09 at 10:07 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> --- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained by the CacheFiles module. This
> > is
> > then used as the SID with which files and directories will be created in the
> > cache.
>
> This i
--- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained by the CacheFiles module. This
> is
> then used as the SID with which files and directories will be created in the
> cache.
This is SELinux specific functionality. It should not be an LSM
interface.
Ca
--- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Make it possible for a process's file creation SID to be temporarily
> overridden
> by CacheFiles so that files created in the cache have the right label
> attached.
>
> Without this facility, files created in the cache will be given the current
> f
Add an act-as SID to task_security_struct that is equivalent to fsuid/fsgid in
task_struct. This permits a task to perform operations as if it is the
overriding SID, without changing its own SID as that might be needed to control
access to the process by ptrace, signals, /proc, etc.
This is usefu
Add an address space operation to write one single page of data to an inode at
a page-aligned location (thus permitting the implementation to be highly
optimised).
This is used by CacheFiles to store the contents of netfs pages into their
backing file pages.
Supply a generic implementation for th
Get the SID under which the CacheFiles module should operate so that the
SELinux security system can control the accesses it makes.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 20
security/dummy.c |7 +++
security/selinux
Make it possible for a process's file creation SID to be temporarily overridden
by CacheFiles so that files created in the cache have the right label attached.
Without this facility, files created in the cache will be given the current
file creation SID of whatever process happens to have invoked
Add a function to install a monitor on the page lock waitqueue for a particular
page, thus allowing the page being unlocked to be detected.
This is used by CacheFiles to detect read completion on a page in the backing
filesystem so that it can then copy the data to the waiting netfs page.
Signed-
Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained by the CacheFiles module. This is
then used as the SID with which files and directories will be created in the
cache.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +
security/dummy.c |6
Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/super.c |2 ++
kernel/auditsc.c |2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index fc8ebed..c0d99dd 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
++
The attached patch makes it possible for the NFS filesystem to make use of the
network filesystem local caching service (FS-Cache).
To be able to use this, an updated mount program is required. This can be
obtained from:
http://people.redhat.com/steved/cachefs/util-linux/
To mount an NF
The attached patch causes read_cache_pages() to release page-private data on a
page for which add_to_page_cache() fails or the filler function fails. This
permits pages with caching references associated with them to be cleaned up.
The invalidatepage() address space op is called (indirectly) to do
Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function to add a waiter to the back of a
wait queue instead of the front.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/wait.h |1 +
kernel/wait.c| 18 ++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff
These patches add local caching for network filesystems such as NFS and AFS.
FS-Cache now runs fully asynchronously as required by Trond Myklebust for NFS.
--
Changes:
(*) The CacheFiles module no longer accepts directory fds in its cull and
inuse commands from cachefilesd. Instead it u
This one-line patch fixes the missing export of copy_page introduced
by the cachefile patches. This patch is not yet upstream, but is required
for cachefile on ia64. It will be pushed upstream when cachefile goes
upstream.
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-Off-By: David H
Recruit a couple of page flags to aid in cache management. The following extra
flags are defined:
(1) PG_fscache (PG_owner_priv_2)
The marked page is backed by a local cache and is pinning resources in the
cache driver.
(2) PG_fscache_write (PG_owner_priv_3)
The marked page is
> > This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fsetattr
> > semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
> > to "silly-renaming".
>
> How do you plan to do that?
Easy: the SFTP protocol has stateful opens and defines an FSTAT call.
Miklos
-
To unsubscrib
On Thu, Aug 09, 2007 at 05:27:45PM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fsetattr
> semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
> to "silly-renaming".
How do you plan to do that?
--b.
-
To unsubscribe from this list
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Pass the open file into the filesystem's ->getattr() method for
fstat().
This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fstat
semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
to "silly-renaming".
Do this by adding a 'stru
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Pass the open file into the filesystem's ->setattr() method for
fchmod, fchown and some of the utimes variants.
This is needed to be able to correctly implement open-unlink-fsetattr
semantics in some filesystem such as sshfs, without having to resort
to "s
From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Add a new filesystem flag, that results in the VFS not checking if the
current process has enough privileges to do an mknod().
This is needed on filesystems, where an unprivileged user may be able
to create a device node, without causing security problems.
VFS tweaks needed for some FUSE features, but possibly useful to other
filesystems as well.
Comments are welcome.
--
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From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Add a new attribute flag ATTR_OPEN, with the meaning: "truncation was
initiated by open() due to the O_TRUNC flag".
This way filesystems wanting to implement truncation within their
->open() method can ignore such truncate requests.
This is a quick & dirt
On Wed, 8 Aug 2007 22:05:13 +0200 (CEST)
Jan Engelhardt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Aug 8 2007 09:48, Andrew Morton wrote:
> >> > On Mon, 6 Aug 2007 09:54:03 -0400
> >> > Jeff Layton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Is there any way in which we can prevent these problems? Say
> >>
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