Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

2007-06-22 Thread Chris Wright
* Chris Mason ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: I'm sure people there will have a different versions of events. The one part that was discussed was if pathname based security was useful, and a number of the people in the room (outside of novell) said it was. Now, it could be that nobody wanted to

Re: [RFC 0/28] Patches to pass vfsmount to LSM inode security hooks

2007-02-07 Thread Chris Wright
* Andreas Gruenbacher ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Reiserfs currently only marks the .reiserfs_priv directory as private, but not the files below it -- how about the attached patch to fix that? I don't think that's right. Look at -create or -lookup. Both of those properly set the private flag.

Re: [RFC 2/28] Remove redundant check from proc_setattr().

2007-02-05 Thread Chris Wright
* Tony Jones ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Remove redundant check from proc_setattr() Indeed, I'll take that straight away. thanks, -chris - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-fsdevel in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at

Re: [RFC 0/28] Patches to pass vfsmount to LSM inode security hooks

2007-02-05 Thread Chris Wright
* Trond Myklebust ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: On Mon, 2007-02-05 at 18:44 +, Christoph Hellwig wrote: Just FYI: Al was very opposed to the idea of passing the vfsmount to the vfs_ helpers, so you should discuss this with him. Looking at the actual patches I see you're lazy in a lot

Re: [RFC 0/28] Patches to pass vfsmount to LSM inode security hooks

2007-02-05 Thread Chris Wright
* Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: They are being posted now as a request for comment. Presently the AppArmor code - being a user of the LSM interface - does not receive the vfsmount correspoding to an operation and has to employ convoluted and slow mechanisms in an

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Generic fallback for security xattrs

2005-08-19 Thread Chris Wright
* Christoph Hellwig ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: On Fri, Aug 19, 2005 at 01:57:56PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: Note that this approach may be controversial [1]; it has been suggested that we should instead be modifying all filesystem types to support security (and other) xattrs natively,