On Thursday 12 April 2007 12:37, Alan Cox wrote:
The proc file system may not be mounted at /proc. There are environments
where this is done for good reason (eg not wanting the /proc info exposed
to a low trust environment). Another is when FUSE is providing an
arbitrated proc either by
On Thursday 12 April 2007 12:37, Alan Cox wrote:
+ if (PTR_ERR(sa-name) == -ENOENT (check AA_CHECK_FD))
+ denied_mask = 0;
Now there is an interesting question. Is PTR_ERR() safe for kernel
pointers on all platforms or just for user ones ?
It's used for kernel
Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
On Thursday 12 April 2007 12:37, Alan Cox wrote:
+ if (PTR_ERR(sa-name) == -ENOENT (check AA_CHECK_FD))
+ denied_mask = 0;
Now there is an interesting question. Is PTR_ERR() safe for kernel
pointers on all platforms or just for
The underlying functions by which the AppArmor LSM hooks are implemented.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/apparmor/main.c | 1322 +++
1 file changed, 1322 insertions(+)
+ * aa_taskattr_access
+ * @name: name of the file to check
+ *
+ * Check if name matches /proc/self/attr/current, with self resolved
+ * to the current pid. This file is the usermode iterface for
+ * changing one's hat.
+ */
+static inline int aa_taskattr_access(const char *name)
+{
+
