On Thu, 2 Dec 1999, Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
- process can modify the attributes of the file it wants to link
This must be enforced to achieve security (also the very silly quota issue
will be addressed), I agree with you. I agree to change this. I also don't
think the breakage would be
On Wed, 1 Dec 1999, Peter J. Braam wrote:
2. Hard links across directories are not permitted. Jan explained that
security is an issue here.
I think there is wrong thinking in the way Unix does things normally and
the security argument goes away when the following reasoning is
On Thu, 2 Dec 1999, Alexander Viro wrote:
such games link() is the least of your problems - it's effect can be
completely reproduced with plain open(). exec 42/bar/foo and several
hours after that sh -c /dev/fd/42 will do the trick - fork() preserves
open descriptors.
If there was really a
Let's just take one step back.
Al has successfully pointed out that one should not expect too much in
terms of security improvements for my hardlink suggestion.
Al additionally gave two reasons, totally unrelated to the security
issues, not to implement the link semantics as I suggested:
Peter J. Braam writes:
Let's just take one step back.
Al has successfully pointed out that one should not expect too much in
terms of security improvements for my hardlink suggestion.
Al additionally gave two reasons, totally unrelated to the security
issues, not to implement the
