igned-off-by: Al Viro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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On Tue, 7 Aug 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Yeah, I did that in v1, but didn't want to add two new security_ hooks.
> But I'll send a v4 doing that.
Yep, add what's actually needed.
Continually having to jump through all of these hoops for LSM has gone
beyond ridiculous.
On Tue, 7 Aug 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Shall I resend without the LSM_NEED_LOCK, or do you still want a more
> fundamental change?
Removing the needlock is enough, the rest was just a query/suggestion.
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if (err)
remove_privs();
with
void remove_privs()
{
mutex_lock();
__remove_privs();
mutex_unlock();
}
and then __remove_privs() handles the logic for all file privileges,
including at this stage suid and the LSM call for file caps ?
- James
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James
required exit code
> - remove a bunch of no longer used exports
>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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tested.
Thanks!
Verified and applied to:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git#for-linus
- James
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urrent->euid != tsk->uid)
> + && (current->euid != tsk->suid)) {
> + put_task_struct(tsk);
> + return -EACCES;
I wonder if we should allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to do this, too.
--
James Morris
<[EMAIL PROT
On Thu, 19 Jul 2007, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 19 Jul 2007, Jim Kovaric wrote:
>
> > IBMs TAMOS (Tivoli Access Manager for Operating systems) contains a
> > loadable module,
> > which is an "out of tree module", and registers "itself" as a s
requires that SElinux be "disabled"
Please provide a link to the source code, so we can understand how you're
using the API.
- James
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the b
y infrastructure, then they should bear the cost and
responsibility of doing that and not expect others to do so as well.
I don't see how this is even slightly difficult to understand.
- James
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tree code.
> Or we just apply the patch and see who yells :)
It's already pretty clear.
- James
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)
>
>
> Here you go..
Thanks.
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network problems.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c| 21 +++--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 41 -
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+),
issue reported by Michal Piotrowski here:
* http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/7/12/362
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/net/netlabel.h |6 +++
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |5 +++
net/netlab
+
net/netlabel/netlabel_mgmt.h |5 +++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 49
7 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
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On Fri, 13 Jul 2007, Michal Piotrowski wrote:
>
> My system is too secure, I can not login :)
Do you have CONFIG_NETLABEL=y ?
If so, please try disabling it.
- James
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Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
security policy has changed since the files were opened.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Updated version against latest Linus git. Jens, I
ROTECTED]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
(Will need to check it's ok again after final merge).
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This is an updated set of 2.6.23 SELinux changes, rebased & tested against
current git. The vmsplice patch has been dropped from this and will be
resubmitted via Jens. Also added an ack from Chris Wright for the mmap
null dereference hooks (which I'd forgotten to add to my tree some time
ago)
On Sun, 8 Jul 2007, James Morris wrote:
> Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
> security policy has changed since the files were opened.
This patch clashes with changes which came in via Jens (who I'll submit
the patch via once it's fixed
suggested by Steve Beattie, rather than jump into a
> conditional block in certain cases, define and use a
> static inline bprm_clear_caps().
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Good idea.
Acked-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
--
James Morris
On Tue, 10 Jul 2007, Jan Engelhardt wrote:
>
> On Jul 8 2007 22:59, James Morris wrote:
> >@@ -420,8 +420,12 @@ static int dummy_file_ioctl (struct file *file,
> >unsigned int command,
> >
> > static int dummy_file_mmap (struct fil
From: Adrian Bunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Remove unneeded export.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/security.c |1 -
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/s
ng
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/avc.c | 10 +---
security/selinux/hooks.c
ich I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 15 +++
include
network problems.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c| 21 +++--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 34 +-
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3
s it stands
today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c |7 +++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/poli
From: Tobias Oed <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Inode numbers are unsigned long and so need to %lu as format string of printf.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Oed <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/avc.c |2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertio
OFFSET, the inode of the index file
DIV 33 is the class number. The inode of the permission file % 33 is the
index of the permission for that class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/include
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
security policy has changed since the files were opened.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
From: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Specify the inode counter explicitly in sel_make_dir(), rather than always
using sel_last_ino.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/
From: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[
From: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
sel_remove_bools() will also be used by the object class discovery, rename
it for more general use.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/s
object class discovery
Eric Paris (2):
selinux: introduce schedule points in policydb_destroy()
security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap
James Morris (1):
security: revalidate rw permissions for sys_splice and sys_vmsplice
Paul Moore (1):
SELinux: use
aside from
the above).
- James
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;
> This became dead code.
Thanks, it was already fixed in my tree.
- James
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
ned-off-by: Adrian Bunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Thanks, applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git#for-akpm
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On Thu, 28 Jun 2007, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 28, 2007 at 11:41:38AM -0400, James Morris wrote:
> > Move mmap_min_addr sysctl to /proc/sys/vm, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
>
> Probably too late, since it's userspace visible. Everyone using
> /proc/sys/kernel/
proc/sys/kernel/mmap_min_addr to
> 65536.
>
> Repeat: I think you should have used /proc/sys/vm/ for that tunable.
Andrew, I sent patches for these earlier. Possibly lost somewhere?
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118304565827673&w=2
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=11
pathname?
- James
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Move mmap_min_addr sysctl to /proc/sys/vm, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 14 --
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 15 +++
kernel/sysctl.c
Don't enable minimum mmap checking by default in SELinux, as it may break
existing applications which do not have updated policy.
We will be able to enable it by default later, once we have code to handle
new permissions which are not present in the user's policy.
Signed-off-by: Ja
te for this case).
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
d a bunch of scenarios: allmodconfig, lsm=y,cap=n,
selinux=y,cap=n etc.
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oduces several unnecessary problems which then need to be addressed.
A better approach would be to make LSM a statically linked interface.
This would also allow us to unexport the LSM symbols and reduce the API
abuse by third-party modules.
- James
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James Morris
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]&g
e as loadable modules.
> The mere fact
> that SELinux cannot be built as a module is a rather weak argument for
> disabling LSM modules as a whole, so please don't.
That's not the argument. Please review the thread.
- James
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ot a kernel in approximately
the same time as loading a module.
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m() is prefered
> over untyped __setup()...
I didn't know module_param was preferred.
The idea was that root_plug is example code, and should do the typical
thing, which I thought would be __setup.
I can easily change it if needed.
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To unsu
root_plug modules are now specified at
boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Changes:
- retain capability.disable kernel param name
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++
security/K
On Sun, 24 Jun 2007, Chris Wright wrote:
> * James Morris ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> > -module_param_named(disable, capability_disable, int, 0);
> > -MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable, "To disable capabilities module set disable =
> > 1");
> > +
> > +static in
and root_plug modules have been
converted to kernel parameters.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Please review & let me know if anything is broken.
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++
ols and reduce the API
abuse by third-party modules.
- James
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ce labeling.
Some of us took the time to perform analysis and then provide feedback on
this, in good faith.
The underlying issues only came up again in response to an inflammatory
post by Lars. If you want to avoid discussions of AppArmor's design, then
I suggest taking it up with those
pretty lame.
I think this raises substantial questions about the value of AppArmor.
What is the point of having a jail if it leaves gaping holes that
malicious code could use to escape?
And why isn't this documented clearly, with the implications fully
explained?" - David Wag
ed by
the documentation, and its policy does not reflect its actual confinement
properties. That's kind of a technical issue, right?
- James
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simply does not and can not work is a fairly significant consideration, I
would imagine.
- James
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; + if ((inode->i_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC) ||
> + (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)) {
> + return 1; /*can't measure */
> + }
I'm pretty sure you should skip measurement for many more pseudo
filesystems than this.
- Jame
malley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Patch : http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/6/7/334
> Status : patch available
This patch is queued for -mm, and will be submitted for 2.6.23.
- James
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To unsubscribe from thi
On Fri, 15 Jun 2007, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> --- James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > On my system, it takes about 1.2 seconds to label a fully checked out
> > kernel source tree with ~23,000 files in this manner
>
> That's an eternity for th
On Fri, 15 Jun 2007, Seth Arnold wrote:
> The time for restorecon is probably best imagined as a kind of 'du' that
> also updates extended attributes as it does its work. It'd be very
> difficult to improve on this.
restorecon can most definitely be improved.
- James
ecurity
logic. DAC permissions don't change on every file in the subtree when you
mv directories, either.
- James
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Mo
rmission changes as a result.
OTOH, you've performed your labeling up front, and don't have to
effectively relabel each file each time on each access, which is what
you're really doing with pathname labeling.
- James
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an idea of the cost by running something like:
$ time find /usr/src/linux | xargs setfattr -n user.foo -v bar
On my system, it takes about 1.2 seconds to label a fully checked out
kernel source tree with ~23,000 files in this manner, on a stock standard
ext3 filesystem with a SATA drive.
- Ja
ies, to say, just those running as
user_t in directories labeled as public_html_t (or whatever).
- James
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hat it could be implemented via policy alone (e.g. run
the task in a domain where all accesses are allowed and logged); and it
would also be of limited usefulness because of the aforementioned problems
with learning mode security policy.
- James
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To
te__((format,..)) of
> audit_log_format
> doesn't give us a warning.
> Compile tested only.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tobias Oed <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Thanks, tested & applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git#for-akpm
--
James Morris
&
motion due to the
> latencies. With the patch it's 100%, totally smooth! Thanks!
>
> Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git#for-akpm
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check. Set the default value to
64KB as suggested. If already set, the existing value will be used.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +
.mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
proc_doulongvec_minmax
(I can fix this in my tree rather than a resend just for this, if
there are some acks & no other problems).
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On Tue, 5 Jun 2007, Eric Paris wrote:
> +extern int mmap_protect_memory;
This should be an unsigned long.
I wonder if the default should be for this value to be zero (i.e. preserve
existing behavior). It could break binaries, albeit potentially insecure
ones.
- James
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ther two suggestions sound better.
- James
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malley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Status : unknown
Not sure what the criteria are for being listed as a regression, but this
problem was likely introduced many moons ago with changes which reduced
the memory footprint of security policy.
--
James M
n trying to do something for 130ms in the kernel.
- James
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queue remove this, so it'll depend on exactly which patches you have
applied).
- James
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t; sshd-4828 0.N.. 465894us : avtab_search_node (context_struct_compute_av)
What do the 0DNs fields mean and what did you use to create this trace?
- James
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On Wed, 30 May 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Wed, 30 May 2007 09:15:01 +0200
> Jens Axboe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, May 29 2007, James Morris wrote:
> > > Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
> > > secu
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case
security policy has changed since the files were opened.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Please review. Note that this brings the splice co
s attribute based, not label based. The
> distinction may be hair splitting in the current context, but
> could be significant later if the thread continues.
What's important is that traditional DAC stores the security attributes
of the object with the object. Call them what you want,
beling).
- James
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. There is no confinement beyond
that.
- James
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Please read
ct 'sysadmin' has:
read access to /etc/shadow
read/write access to /views/sysadmin/etc/shadow
where the objects referenced by the paths are identical and visible to the
subject along both paths, in keeping with your description of "policy may
allow access to some locations but
ut
> not to others. That's not a hole.
I don't know what else you'd call it.
Would you mind providing some concrete examples of how such a model would
be useful?
- James
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On Tue, 8 May 2007, Rusty Russell wrote:
> 1) Bridging via host is broken: we need to set "promisc" bit in MAC
>address published by the host so the guest sends us everything.
>Thanks James Morris for the report (I don't use bridging).
>
> 2) Lguest networ
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 38 ++
1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff
From: James Carter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Remove the unused enumeration constant, SEL_AVC, from the sel_inos
enumeration in selinuxfs.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sig
Carter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 11 +--
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git
CTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c |6 ++
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index
PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/avc.c |2 +
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 102 ---
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h| 179 --
security/selinux/include
D]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h |2 +
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c| 67 +++
security/selinux/ss/services.c |7
3 file
thing which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c|2 +-
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 121 ++
From: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Add Eric Paris as an SELinux maintainer.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
MAINTAINERS |4 +++-
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --g
From: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris
t from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c|3 -
se
From: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
This patch collects all of the CIPSO constants and puts them in one place; it
also documents each value explaining how the value is derived.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
n
From: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
This patch changes a BUG_ON in the CIPSO code to a runtime check. It should
also increase the readability of the code as it replaces an unexplained
constant with a well defined macro.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by:
ity/selinux/include/{selinux_netlabel.h => netlabel.h} (94%)
create mode 100644 security/selinux/netlabel.c
--
James Morris
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More m
t like a bug with wait or ptrace or
something.
This patch makes do_wait return -EACCES (or other appropriate
error returned from security_task_wait() instead of -ECHILD if some
children were ruled out solely because security_task_wait failed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On Mon, 23 Apr 2007, Roland McGrath wrote:
> As I said in some earlier discussion following my original patch, that
> would be fine with me. I haven't coded up that variant, but it's simple
> enough. Would you like to do it?
Sure.
--
James Morris
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]&
On Thu, 15 Mar 2007, Roland McGrath wrote:
> This patch makes do_wait return -EPERM instead of -ECHILD if some
> children were ruled out solely because security_task_wait failed.
What about using the return value from the security_task_wait hook (which
should be -EACCES) ?
- James
--
it, a BUG_ON has been added to pinpoint the cause
of any problems potentially caused by this (and as a form of annotation).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c| 72 +++-
fs/sysfs/group.c |6 +++-
i
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