RE: [PATCH 3/5] cifsd: add file operations

> -Original Message- > From: Namjae Jeon > Sent: Sunday, March 21, 2021 10:14 PM > To: linux-fsde...@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux- > c...@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-cifsd-de...@lists.sourceforge.net; smfre...@gmail.com; > senozhat...@chromium.org;

RE: [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook

> -Original Message- > From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org ow...@vger.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Arnd Bergmann > Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2020 1:05 AM > To: Alexei Starovoitov > Cc: James Morris ; Anders Roxell > ; Alexei Starovoitov ; Daniel > Borkmann ; LKML ; > Network Development ;

RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Tim Chen [mailto:tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 2:35 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; Jiri Kosina > ; Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Tom Lendacky ; Ingo Molnar > ; Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ;

RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Tim Chen [mailto:tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 2:35 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; Jiri Kosina > ; Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Tom Lendacky ; Ingo Molnar > ; Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ;

RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

> -Original Message- > From: Tim Chen [mailto:tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 2:31 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; Jiri Kosina > ; Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Tom Lendacky ; Ingo Molnar > ; Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ;

RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

> -Original Message- > From: Tim Chen [mailto:tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 2:31 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; Jiri Kosina > ; Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Tom Lendacky ; Ingo Molnar > ; Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ;

RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks

Woodhouse > ; Andi Kleen ; Hansen, Dave > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Mallick, Asit K ; Arjan van de Ven > ; Jon Masters ; Waiman Long > ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; x...@kernel.org > Subject: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security > sensitive tasks >

RE: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks

Woodhouse > ; Andi Kleen ; Hansen, Dave > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Mallick, Asit K ; Arjan van de Ven > ; Jon Masters ; Waiman Long > ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; x...@kernel.org > Subject: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security > sensitive tasks >

RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

Woodhouse > ; Andi Kleen ; Hansen, Dave > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Mallick, Asit K ; Arjan van de Ven > ; Jon Masters ; Waiman Long > ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; x...@kernel.org Added LSM mail list to the CC: > Subject: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of

RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability

Woodhouse > ; Andi Kleen ; Hansen, Dave > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Mallick, Asit K ; Arjan van de Ven > ; Jon Masters ; Waiman Long > ; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; x...@kernel.org Added LSM mail list to the CC: > Subject: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of

RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel

> -Original Message- > From: James Morris [mailto:jmor...@namei.org] > Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2018 3:47 PM > To: Casey Schaufler > Cc: Schaufler, Casey ; kris...@linux.intel.com; > kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com; Dock, Deneen T > ; linux-kernel@vger.ker

RE: [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel

> -Original Message- > From: James Morris [mailto:jmor...@namei.org] > Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2018 3:47 PM > To: Casey Schaufler > Cc: Schaufler, Casey ; kris...@linux.intel.com; > kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com; Dock, Deneen T > ; linux-kernel@vger.ker

RE: [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED

> -Original Message- > From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:s...@tycho.nsa.gov] > Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2018 8:50 AM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; kernel- > harden...@lists.openwall.com; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-security- > mod...@vger.kernel.org; seli...@tycho.nsa

RE: [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED

> -Original Message- > From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:s...@tycho.nsa.gov] > Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2018 8:50 AM > To: Schaufler, Casey ; kernel- > harden...@lists.openwall.com; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-security- > mod...@vger.kernel.org; seli...@tycho.nsa

RE: [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2018 2:05 AM > To: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; > Tim Chen ; Schaufl

RE: [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2018 2:05 AM > To: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; > Tim Chen ; Schaufl

RE: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > > > @@ -325,10 +326,13 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct > *task, unsigned int mode) > mm = task->mm; > if (mm && > ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && > -

RE: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > > > @@ -325,10 +326,13 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct > *task, unsigned int mode) > mm = task->mm; > if (mm && > ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && > -

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Thomas Gleixner [mailto:t...@linutronix.de] ... > > Casey, can you please spare us the completely redundant copy of the mail > header? Sorry to be a bother. > > Short of a patch to show the changes (which I wish I could do today, but > > really can't) what I

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Thomas Gleixner [mailto:t...@linutronix.de] ... > > Casey, can you please spare us the completely redundant copy of the mail > header? Sorry to be a bother. > > Short of a patch to show the changes (which I wish I could do today, but > > really can't) what I

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 1:42 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 1:42 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 12:36 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 12:36 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 12:14 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 12:14 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; &

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 2:24 AM > To: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; > Tim Chen ; Schaufler, Cas

RE: [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Monday, September 10, 2018 2:24 AM > To: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Andi Kleen ; > Tim Chen ; Schaufler, Cas

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2018 12:03 PM > To: Andrea Arcangeli > Cc: Jiri Kosina ; Andi Kleen ; Tim > Chen > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Josh P

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2018 12:03 PM > To: Andrea Arcangeli > Cc: Jiri Kosina ; Andi Kleen ; Tim > Chen > ; Schaufler, Casey ; > Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Josh P

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2018 1:00 AM > To: Jiri Kosina > Cc: Tim Chen ; Thomas Gleixner > ; Ingo Molnar ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Oleg Neste

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2018 1:00 AM > To: Jiri Kosina > Cc: Tim Chen ; Thomas Gleixner > ; Ingo Molnar ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Oleg Neste

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Andrea Arcangeli [mailto:aarca...@redhat.com] > Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2018 4:37 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Jiri Kosina ; Tim Chen ; > Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Woodhouse, David ;

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Andrea Arcangeli [mailto:aarca...@redhat.com] > Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2018 4:37 PM > To: Schaufler, Casey > Cc: Jiri Kosina ; Tim Chen ; > Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Woodhouse, David ;

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2018 10:35 AM > To: Tim Chen > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Oleg Nesterov >

RE: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks

> -Original Message- > From: Jiri Kosina [mailto:ji...@kernel.org] > Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2018 10:35 AM > To: Tim Chen > Cc: Thomas Gleixner ; Ingo Molnar ; > Peter Zijlstra ; Josh Poimboeuf > ; Andrea Arcangeli ; > Woodhouse, David ; Oleg Nesterov >

RE: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2016 7:41 AM > To: Kees Cook > Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep ; Ingo Molnar ; > Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo ; Alexander

RE: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open

> -Original Message- > From: Peter Zijlstra [mailto:pet...@infradead.org] > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2016 7:41 AM > To: Kees Cook > Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep ; Ingo Molnar ; > Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo ; Alexander Shishkin > ; linux-...@vger.kernel.org; kernel- >