On 03/31/2016 04:33 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> From: David Gstir
>
> Implement the leftpad() system call such that userspace,
> especially node.js applications, can in the near future directly
> use it and no longer depend on fragile npm packages.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir
> Signed-
On 03/29/2016 05:25 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>> Yeah I had toyed with using hashes, I used hash_64 not md5 which is like 14
>> extra instructions or something.
>
> That sounds fine. Anything that requires
On 03/29/2016 04:34 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 4:38 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> Then there's an unanswered question: is this patch acceptable given
>> that it's an ABI break? Security fixes are sometimes an exception to
>> the "no ABI breaks" rule, but it's by no m
On 03/29/2016 04:54 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>
>> These patches implement the necessary changes to generate a cookie
>> which will be placed above signal frame upon signal delivery to userland.
>> The cookie is generated using a per-process
On 03/29/2016 03:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> Sigreturn-oriented programming is a new attack vector in userland
>> where an attacker crafts a fake signal frame on the stack and calls
>> sigreturn. The kernel will extract the fake signal
On 03/29/2016 01:59 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 01:53:26PM -0600, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds a sysctl argument to disable SROP protection.
>
> Sysctl needs to be documented in Documentation/sysctl/
>
> Also negated sysctl is weird, normally they are positive (ena
On 03/09/2016 01:32 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Scott Bauer wrote:
>
>> This patch adds a per-process secret to the task struct which
>> will be used during signal delivery and during a sigreturn.
>> Also, logic is added in signal.c to generate, place, extract,
>> clear and verify the signal
On 03/08/2016 02:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This patch adds a per-process se
On 03/08/2016 02:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This patch adds a per-process se
On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds a per-process secret to the task struct which
>> will be used during signal delivery and during a sigreturn.
>> Also, logic is added in signal.c to generate, place, extract,
>>
On 03/08/2016 02:03 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>> static int ia32_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
>> - struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc)
>> + struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc,
>> + void __user **
On 02/08/2016 02:50 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 7, 2016 at 12:10 AM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 02/06/2016 11:35 PM, Mika Penttilä wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07.02.2016 01:39, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This
On 02/06/2016 11:35 PM, Mika Penttilä wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
> On 07.02.2016 01:39, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds SROP mitigation logic to the x86 signal delivery
>> and sigreturn code. The cookie is placed in the unused alignment
>> space above the saved FP state, if it exists. If there is n
On 01/05/2016 02:13 PM, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 05 2016 at 3:16pm -0500,
> Mike Snitzer wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 08 2015 at 1:26pm -0500,
>> Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>> Friendly ping, is anyone interested in this?
>>
>> The passed @
On 12/01/2015 11:11 AM, Scotty wrote:
>
> 0001-dm-ioctl-Access-user-land-memory-through-safe-functi.patch
>
>
> From b26adf880eba03ac6f2b1dd87426bb96fd2a0282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Scotty Bauer
> Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 10:52:46 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] dm
wrote:
> On Thu, 3 Dec 2015 13:54:30 -0700
> Scotty Bauer wrote:
>
>> Since I've seen this a couple times now I'm wondering if my
>> understanding of touching user-land memory is flawed.
>>
>> For the above example Ioctl, the proper way to get access to th
I Have been auditing a few drivers and have found some of them are
accessing user-land memory without either mapping the pages in, or
copying the data via the safe user access apis.
The thing I have mostly been seeing is something along the lines of:
ioctl(etc, etc, arg) {
char buf[32];
__user
It is possible to trace from userland, Android does it.
Essentially you need to write your data into
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker
then read it out of /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
If you care how the implementation works you can read it in
/kernel/tracing/trace.c
(http://lxr.fr
On 02/11/2015 02:55 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 01/30/2015 01:26 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>> mwait_play_dead previously issued a CLFLUSH to work around a bug on
>> some xeon processors. We can now determine if the CPU is a buggy CPU.
>> This patch checks if if we're o
0 machines only instead of
> punishing all CPUs doing idle with MWAIT with the CLFLUSH penalty.
>
> Based on a patch originally by Scotty Bauer .
>
> Cc: Scotty Bauer
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 6 +-
> 1 file changed, 5 ins
mwait_play_dead previously issued a CLFLUSH to work around a bug on some xeon
processors. We can now determine if the CPU is a buggy CPU. This patch checks
if if we're on a buggy CPU which allows non-buggy cpu's to eliminate the
CLFLUSH.
>From 3da1be5c998a8d51f98fdba09b3cb477526c5ff3 Mon Se
On 09/04/2014 02:14 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> If I'm reading it correctly, this is all dead code because si_meminfo()
> unconditionally sets sysinfo.mem_unit to PAGE_SIZE. It could all do with a
> bit of a cleanup, I suspect.
I'll do a little more research on this and do further clean up, if r
Fix undefined behavior and compiler warning by replacing right
shift 32 with upper_32_bits macro
Signed-off-by: Scotty Bauer
---
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ce81291..c78530b 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b
am getting acquainted with the linux kernel and to do so I've been browsing
the source.
In the compat version of sysinfo, kernel/sys.c we see the following:
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
{
struct sysinfo s;
do_sysinfo(&s);
/* Check to see i
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