This is RFC v1 for the SLUB Freelist randomization.
***Background:
This proposal follows the previous SLAB Freelist patch submitted to next.
It resuses parts of previous implementation and keep a similar approach.
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their
allocation
This is RFC v1 for the SLUB Freelist randomization.
***Background:
This proposal follows the previous SLAB Freelist patch submitted to next.
It resuses parts of previous implementation and keep a similar approach.
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their
allocation
Any feedback on the patch? Ingo? Kees?
Kees mentioned he will take care of the build warning on the KASLR
refactor (the function is not used right now).
Thanks,
Thomas
On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
> This is PATCH v5 for KAS
Any feedback on the patch? Ingo? Kees?
Kees mentioned he will take care of the build warning on the KASLR
refactor (the function is not used right now).
Thanks,
Thomas
On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> This is PATCH v5 for KASLR memory implementation for x86
fter
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt |
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 7 ++-
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git
fter
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 7 ++-
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 77 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/k
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 77 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6 +++
arch
This is PATCH v5 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160511 and merge recent KASLR changes.
Integrate
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bce2e5d..f205f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/
This is PATCH v5 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160511 and merge recent KASLR changes.
Integrate
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bce2e5d..f205f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -454,10
]
> [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to
> help improving the system]
>
> url:
> https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Thomas-Garnier/x86-boot-KASLR-memory-randomization/20160513-001319
> config: i386-tinyconfig (attached as .config)
>
ed to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to
> help improving the system]
>
> url:
> https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Thomas-Garnier/x86-boot-KASLR-memory-randomization/20160513-001319
> config: i386-tinyconfig (attached as .config)
> compiler: gcc-6 (Debian 6.
This is PATCH v4 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160511 and merge recent KASLR changes.
Integrate
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bce2e5d..f205f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/
This is PATCH v4 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160511 and merge recent KASLR changes.
Integrate
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bce2e5d..f205f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -454,10
fter
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt |
fter
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 77 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/k
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 77 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6 +++
arch
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 7 ++-
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160511
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 7 ++-
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>> Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical
>> memory mapping, vmalloc & vme
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory sections (physical
>> memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature
>> m
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 12:05 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>> Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
>> kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
>> kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
>&
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>> Add a new option (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING) to define
>> the padding used for the physical memory
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Add a new option (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING) to define
>> the padding used for the physical memory mapping section when KASLR
>> memory i
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/inclu
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6
s 97681.6 (1031.11)
Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90
repeated 10 times):
attemp,before,after
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Tho
s 97681.6 (1031.11)
Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90
repeated 10 times):
attemp,before,after
1,0.076,0.069
2,0.072,0.069
3,0.066,0.066
4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067
6,0.066,0.069
7,0.067,0.066
8,0.063,0.067
9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071
average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
This is PATCH v3 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 89d9747..6adfbce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/
This is PATCH v3 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
Recent changes:
Add performance information on commit.
Add details on PUD alignment.
Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
Rebase on next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of
.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 89d9747..6adfbce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -526,10
, May 2, 2016 at 3:00 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.han...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> -#define __PAGE_OFFSET _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#define __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_R
, May 2, 2016 at 3:00 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> -#define __PAGE_OFFSET _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#define __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE _AC(0x8800, UL)
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
>
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 2:58 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.han...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
>> addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresse
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 2:58 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/02/2016 02:41 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
>> addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
>> KASLR memory
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
splay each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h
splay each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h| 12 +++
ar
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/inclu
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20
This is PATCH v2 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64. Edit commit
based on recents testing against the KASLR bypass exploits & rebase on
next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160502
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
This is PATCH v2 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64. Edit commit
based on recents testing against the KASLR bypass exploits & rebase on
next-20160502.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published
Any feedback on this patch proposal?
Thanks,
Thomas
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 9:39 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
> This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
> were done based on RFC v1 comments.
>
> ***Background:
> The c
Any feedback on this patch proposal?
Thanks,
Thomas
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 9:39 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
> were done based on RFC v1 comments.
>
> ***Background:
> The current implementation of KASLR
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Andrew Morton
<a...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Apr 2016 10:20:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize
>> the SLAB freelist.
>
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Andrew Morton
wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Apr 2016 10:20:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize
>> the SLAB freelist.
>
> Forgot this bit?
>
I thought I would change it w
24)/kfree -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
Acked-by: Chr
24)/kfree -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
---
Based on n
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Andrew Morton
<a...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Apr 2016 09:21:10 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist.
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Andrew Morton
wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Apr 2016 09:21:10 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
>
ee -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph L
ee -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 119 cycles
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
---
Based on next-20160
Make sense. I think it is still valuable to randomize earlier pages. I
will adapt the code, test and send patch v4.
Thanks for the quick feedback,
Thomas
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 5:40 PM, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo@lge.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 01:39:23PM -0700, Thomas Garn
Make sense. I think it is still valuable to randomize earlier pages. I
will adapt the code, test and send patch v4.
Thanks for the quick feedback,
Thomas
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 5:40 PM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 01:39:23PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Provides an
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Andrew Morton
<a...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 14:14:33 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>
>> >>> + /* Get best entropy at this stage */
>> >>> + get_random_byte
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Andrew Morton
wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 14:14:33 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> >>> + /* Get best entropy at this stage */
>> >>> + get_random_bytes_arch(, sizeof(seed));
>> >>
>&g
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Andrew Morton
> <a...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 13:39:23 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
>> wrote
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Andrew Morton
> wrote:
>> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 13:39:23 -0700 Thomas Garnier
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>>
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Andrew Morton
<a...@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 13:39:23 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist.
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Andrew Morton
wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Apr 2016 13:39:23 -0700 Thomas Garnier wrote:
>
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
>
142 cycles
1 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles
1 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119 cycle
142 cycles
1 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 121 cycles
1 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 119 cycles
10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 119 cycles
1 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 119
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160422
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/inclu
Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160422
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6
This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
were done based on RFC v1 comments.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
memory can be overwitten to
This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
were done based on RFC v1 comments.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
memory can be overwitten to
ses. An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can
start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).
x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.c
ses. An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can
start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).
x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each section.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Base
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20160422
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160422
---
arch/x86/Kconfig| 15 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com>
---
Based on next-20
Minor change that allows early boot physical mapping of PUD level virtual
addresses. This change prepares usage of different virtual addresses for
KASLR memory randomization. It has no impact on default usage.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
---
Based on next-20160422
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
were done based on RFC v1 comments.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
memory can be overwitten to
This is PATCH v1 for KASLR memory implementation on x86_64. Minor changes
were done based on RFC v1 comments.
***Background:
The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
memory can be overwitten to
Make sense, thanks for the details.
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 1:15 PM, H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com> wrote:
> On April 21, 2016 8:52:01 AM PDT, Thomas Garnier <thgar...@google.com> wrote:
>>On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:46 AM, H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com> wrote:
>&
Make sense, thanks for the details.
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 1:15 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On April 21, 2016 8:52:01 AM PDT, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:46 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>>> On April 21, 2016 6:30:24 AM PDT, Boris Ostrovsky
>> wrote
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:46 AM, H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com> wrote:
> On April 21, 2016 6:30:24 AM PDT, Boris Ostrovsky
> <boris.ostrov...@oracle.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>> +void __init kernel_ra
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:46 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On April 21, 2016 6:30:24 AM PDT, Boris Ostrovsky
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>> +void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
>>> +{
>>> +size_t
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 6:30 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
<boris.ostrov...@oracle.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>
>> +void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
>> +{
>> + size_t i;
>> + unsigned long addr = memory
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 6:30 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
wrote:
>
>
> On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>
>> +void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
>> +{
>> + size_t i;
>> + unsigned long addr = memory_rand_start;
>>
On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:08 AM, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo@lge.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 09:44:54AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 12:15 AM, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo@lge.com> wrote:
>> > On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:14:39
On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:08 AM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 09:44:54AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 12:15 AM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
>> > On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:14:39AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> >&g
On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 12:15 AM, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo@lge.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:14:39AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initia
On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 12:15 AM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:14:39AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
>>
On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Joerg Roedel <jroe...@suse.de> wrote:
> Hi Thomas,
>
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 03:03:12PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> +/*
>> + * Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization
>> + * of additional CPUs. Co
On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> Hi Thomas,
>
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 03:03:12PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>> +/*
>> + * Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization
>> + * of additional CPUs. Consume only
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