On 6/24/2023 11:25 PM, Markus Elfring wrote:
Change from v4:
…
I suggest to omit the cover letter for a single patch.
Will any patch series evolve for your proposed changes?
No. The thought was to put descriptions unsuitable for commit header in
the cover letter.
thanks,
jane
Regards,
s poison detection to the filesystem
such that instead of reporting VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, it could report
VM_FAULT_HWPOISON.
If user level block IO syscalls fail due to poison, the errno will
be converted to EIO to maintain block API consistency.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/dax/super.c
from leaking
out to block read(2). Suggested by Matthew.
Jane Chu (1):
dax: enable dax fault handler to report VM_FAULT_HWPOISON
drivers/dax/super.c | 5 -
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c| 2 +-
drivers/s390/block/dcssblk.c | 3 ++-
fs/dax.c | 11
On 6/8/2023 8:16 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
+static inline int dax_mem2blk_err(int err)
+{
+ return (err == -EHWPOISON) ? -EIO : err;
+}
I think it is worth a comment on this function to indicate where this
helper is *not* used. I.e. it's easy to grep for where the error code is
conv
Ping... Is there any further concern?
-jane
On 5/8/2023 10:47 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
When multiple processes mmap() a dax file, then at some point,
a process issues a 'load' and consumes a hwpoison, the process
receives a SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_AR and with si_lsb
set for
s poison detection to the filesystem
such that instead of reporting VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, it could report
VM_FAULT_HWPOISON.
If user level block IO syscalls fail due to poison, the errno will
be converted to EIO to maintain block API consistency.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/dax/super.c
Change from v3:
Prevent leaking EHWPOISON to user level block IO calls such as
zero_range_range, and truncate. Suggested by Dan.
Change from v2:
Convert EHWPOISON to EIO to prevent EHWPOISON errno from leaking
out to block read(2). Suggested by Matthew.
Jane Chu (1):
dax: enable dax fault
On 5/4/2023 7:32 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
Jane Chu wrote:
When multiple processes mmap() a dax file, then at some point,
a process issues a 'load' and consumes a hwpoison, the process
receives a SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_AR and with si_lsb
set for the poison scope. Soon after,
s poison detection to the filesystem
such that instead of reporting VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, it could report
VM_FAULT_HWPOISON.
Change from v2:
Convert -EHWPOISON to -EIO to prevent EHWPOISON errno from leaking
out to block read(2) - suggested by Matthew.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdim
On 4/27/2023 4:48 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 04:36:58PM -0700, Jane Chu wrote:
This change results in EHWPOISON leaking to usersapce in the case of
read(2), that's not a return code that block I/O applications have ever
had to contend with before. Just as badblocks
Hi, Dan,
On 4/27/2023 2:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
Jane Chu wrote:
When dax fault handler fails to provision the fault page due to
hwpoison, it returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS which lead to a sigbus delivered
to userspace with .si_code BUS_ADRERR. Channel dax backend driver's
detection on hwpois
Hi, Dan,
On 4/27/2023 2:36 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
Jane Chu wrote:
When dax fault handler fails to provision the fault page due to
hwpoison, it returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS which lead to a sigbus delivered
to userspace with .si_code BUS_ADRERR. Channel dax backend driver's
detection on hwpois
Ping, any comment?
thanks,
-jane
On 4/6/2023 4:01 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
When dax fault handler fails to provision the fault page due to
hwpoison, it returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS which lead to a sigbus delivered
to userspace with .si_code BUS_ADRERR. Channel dax backend driver's
detection on hwp
igned-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 2 +-
fs/dax.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm.h| 2 ++
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c b/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
index ceea55f621cc..46e094e56159 100644
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
On 4/6/2023 12:32 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
On Thu, Apr 06, 2023 at 11:55:56AM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
static vm_fault_t dax_fault_return(int error)
{
if (error == 0)
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
- return vmf_error(error);
+ else if (error == -ENOMEM
igned-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 2 +-
fs/dax.c | 14 --
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c b/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
index ceea55f621cc..46e094e56159 100644
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/p
e.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 13 -
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x8
On 8/26/2022 11:09 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2022 at 10:54:31AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> How about:
>>
>> ---
>>
>> When memory poison consumption machine checks fire,
>> mce-notifier-handlers like nfit_handle_mce() record the impacted
>> physical address range.
>
> ... whi
On 8/23/2022 9:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 01:50:53PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
&
gt; APEI error granularities are managed. So I think it is appropriate for
> this to go through the x86 tree via the typical path for mce related
> topics.
+ Huang, Ying.
x86 maintainers,
Please let me know if you need another revision.
thanks,
-jane
On 8/8/2022 4:30 PM, Dan Willia
On 8/3/2022 1:53 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Jane Chu wrote:
>
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>
> s/Commit/commit
Maintainers,
Would you prefer a v8, or take care the comment upon accepting the patch?
>
>
n hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 13 -
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
On 8/2/2022 3:59 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Jane Chu wrote:
>
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
>> badrange according to 1ULL &l
n hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 14 +-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ke
On 8/1/2022 2:20 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 8/1/2022 9:44 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>>>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_
On 8/1/2022 9:44 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
>> badrange according to 1ULL << MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(
On 8/1/2022 8:58 AM, Luck, Tony wrote:
>> struct mce m;
>> +int lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> Some maintainers like to order local declaration lines from longest to
> shortest
>
>> + /*
>> + * Even if the ->validation_bits are set for address mask,
>> + * to be extra safe, check
n hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 14 +-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ke
On 7/28/2022 11:46 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 7/27/2022 1:01 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> On 7/27/2022 12:30 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>>>> On 7/27/2022 12:24 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>>>>> On
On 7/27/2022 1:01 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 7/27/2022 12:30 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>> On 7/27/2022 12:24 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> On 7/27/2022 11:56 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>>>> With
On 7/27/2022 12:30 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
> On 7/27/2022 12:24 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 7/27/2022 11:56 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>>>> poison granularity&q
On 7/27/2022 12:24 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
> On 7/27/2022 11:56 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback
On 7/27/2022 11:56 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
>> badrange according to 1ULL << MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(
n hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 14 +-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ke
On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote:
>> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
>> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
>> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
>> so it might be a good follow-on
n hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8...@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/ap
On 7/15/2022 9:50 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
>> poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
>> badrange according to 1ULL << MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(
n hardware whenever
support is available.
v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/7/15/1040
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 6 +-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
index 717192915f28..a4d5
On 7/15/2022 12:17 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> [ add Tony ]
>
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 7/14/2022 6:19 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> I meant to say there would be 8 calls to the nfit_handle_mce() callback,
>>>> one call for each poi
On 7/14/2022 5:58 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
>>>
> However, the ARS engine likely can return the precise error ranges so I
> think the fix is to just use the address range indicated by 1UL <<
> MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(mce->misc) to filter the results from a short ARS
> scrub request to
On 7/14/2022 6:19 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> I meant to say there would be 8 calls to the nfit_handle_mce() callback,
>> one call for each poison with accurate address.
>>
>> Also, short ARS would find 2 poisons.
>>
>> I attached the console
On 7/13/2022 5:24 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 7/12/2022 5:48 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> Jane Chu wrote:
>>>> Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine poison
>>>> granularity") changed nfit_handle_mc
On 7/12/2022 5:48 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Jane Chu wrote:
>> Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine poison
>> granularity") changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report badrange for
>> each poison at an alignment indicated by 1
a. it happens to be the badblock granularity,
b. ndctl inject-error cannot inject more than one poison to a 512-byte block,
c. architecture agnostic
Fixes: 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine poison
granularity")
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c
On 6/30/2022 11:29 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> Looks good:
>
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig
Thank you!
-jane
set)
49 {
50 return pmem->phys_addr + offset;
51 }
52
Fixes: 9409c9b6709e (pmem: refactor pmem_clear_poison())
Reported-by: kernel test robot
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --g
On 6/30/2022 11:04 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:51:55AM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
>> -static phys_addr_t to_phys(struct pmem_device *pmem, phys_addr_t offset)
>> +static phys_addr_t _to_phys(struct pmem_device *pmem, phys_addr_t offset)
>
>
set)
49 {
50 return pmem->phys_addr + offset;
51 }
52
Fixes: 9409c9b6709e (pmem: refactor pmem_clear_poison())
Reported-by: kernel test robot
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dr
On 3/30/2022 9:18 AM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 08:49:29AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>> On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 06:58:21PM +0800, Shiyang Ruan wrote:
>>> As the code I pasted before, pmem driver will subtract its ->data_offset,
>>> which is byte-based. And the filesyste
ger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: Phantom PMEM poison issue
>
> On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 12:40:18AM +, Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 1/21/2022 4:31 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>> On baremetal Intel platform with DCPMEM installed and configured to
>>> provision daxfs, say a pois
On 1/21/2022 5:27 PM, Luck, Tony wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 12:40:18AM +0000, Jane Chu wrote:
>> On 1/21/2022 4:31 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
>>> On baremetal Intel platform with DCPMEM installed and configured to
>>> provision daxfs, say a poison was consumed by a load
On 1/21/2022 4:31 PM, Jane Chu wrote:
> On baremetal Intel platform with DCPMEM installed and configured to
> provision daxfs, say a poison was consumed by a load from a user thread,
> and then daxfs takes action and clears the poison, confirmed by "ndctl
> -NM".
>
&
On baremetal Intel platform with DCPMEM installed and configured to
provision daxfs, say a poison was consumed by a load from a user thread,
and then daxfs takes action and clears the poison, confirmed by "ndctl
-NM".
Now, depends on the luck, after sometime(from a few seconds to 5+ hours)
the
On 11/4/2021 10:55 AM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 05:31:32PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
>> +static int pmem_dax_clear_poison(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff,
>> +size_t nr_pages)
>> +{
>> +unsigned
On 9/15/2021 9:15 AM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 12:22:05AM -0700, Jane Chu wrote:
Hi, Dan,
On 9/14/2021 9:44 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:32 PM Jane Chu wrote:
If pwrite(2) encounters poison in a pmem range, it fails with EIO.
This is unecessary if
On 9/15/2021 1:27 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
I'm also thinking about the MOVEDIR64B instruction and how it
might be used to clear poison on the fly with a single 'store'.
Of course, that means we need to figure out how to narrow down the
error blast radius first.
It turns out the MOVDIR64B error cl
Hi, Dan,
On 9/14/2021 9:44 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:32 PM Jane Chu wrote:
If pwrite(2) encounters poison in a pmem range, it fails with EIO.
This is unecessary if hardware is capable of clearing the poison.
Though not all dax backend hardware has the capability of
Provide pmem_dax_clear_poison() to struct dax_operations.clear_poison.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 17 +
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c b/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
index 1e0615b8565e..307a53aa3432 100644
--- a/drivers
le to, first, speed up repairing by means of it;
second, maintain backend continuity instead of fragmenting it in
search for clean blocks.
Jane Chu (3):
dax: introduce dax_operation dax_clear_poison
dax: introduce dax_clear_poison to dax pwrite operation
libnvdimm/pmem: Provide pmem_dax_clear_p
When pwrite(2) encounters poison in a dax range, it fails with EIO.
But if the backend hardware of the dax device is capable of clearing
poison, try that and resume the write.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
fs/dax.c | 9 +
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c
locks.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/dax/super.c | 13 +
include/linux/dax.h | 6 ++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/dax/super.c b/drivers/dax/super.c
index 44736cbd446e..935d496fa7db 100644
--- a/drivers/dax/super.c
+++ b/drivers/dax/super.c
@@ -373,6 +3
Currenty, when pwrite(2) s issued to a dax range that contains poison,
the pwrite(2) fails with EIO. Well, if the hardware backend of the
dax device is capable of clearing poison, try that and resume the write.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
fs/dax.c | 9 +
1 file changed, 9 insertions
It appears that unmap_mapping_range() actually takes a 'size' as its
third argument rather than a location, the current calling fashion
causes unecessary amount of unmapping to occur.
Fixes: 6100e34b2526e ("mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about
dev_pagemap pages")
Hi, Shiyang,
On 12/18/2020 1:13 AM, Ruan Shiyang wrote:
So I tried the patchset with pmem error injection, the SIGBUS payload
does not look right -
** SIGBUS(7): **
** si_addr(0x(nil)), si_lsb(0xC), si_code(0x4, BUS_MCEERR_AR) **
I expect the payload looks like
** si_addr(0x7f3672e0), si
Hi, Shiyang,
On 12/15/2020 4:14 AM, Shiyang Ruan wrote:
The call trace is like this:
memory_failure()
pgmap->ops->memory_failure() => pmem_pgmap_memory_failure()
gendisk->fops->corrupted_range() => - pmem_corrupted_range()
- md_blk_corrupted_range
On 12/15/2020 4:14 AM, Shiyang Ruan wrote:
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+int bd_disk_holder_corrupted_range(struct block_device *bdev, loff_t off,
+ size_t len, void *data);
int bd_link_disk_holder(struct block_device *bdev, struct gendisk *disk);
void bd_unlink_disk
On 12/15/2020 3:58 AM, Ruan Shiyang wrote:
Hi Jane
On 2020/12/15 上午4:58, Jane Chu wrote:
Hi, Shiyang,
On 11/22/2020 4:41 PM, Shiyang Ruan wrote:
This patchset is a try to resolve the problem of tracking shared page
for fsdax.
Change from v1:
- Intorduce ->block_lost() for block dev
Hi, Shiyang,
On 11/22/2020 4:41 PM, Shiyang Ruan wrote:
This patchset is a try to resolve the problem of tracking shared page
for fsdax.
Change from v1:
- Intorduce ->block_lost() for block device
- Support mapped device
- Add 'not available' warning for realtime device in XFS
- Reb
bit. Hence security_show() should check the
'overwrite' bit first, in order to indicate the actual state when multiple
bits are set in the flags.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang
---
drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff
097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite
support")
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang
---
drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/securi
2e82 ("libnvdimm/security: Introduce a 'frozen' attribute")
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang
---
drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c
index 4cef69b..8
Hi, Dave,
On 8/3/2020 1:41 PM, Dave Jiang wrote:
On 7/24/2020 9:09 AM, Jane Chu wrote:
Since
commit d78c620a2e82 ("libnvdimm/security: Introduce a 'frozen'
attribute"),
when issue
# ndctl sanitize-dimm nmem0 --overwrite
then immediately check the 'security' at
097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite
support")
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c
index 8f3971c..4b8015
exclusive bits before it checks
the 'overwrite' bit at last. The order should be reversed.
The commit also has a typo: in one occasion, 'nvdimm->sec.ext_state'
assignment is replaced with 'nvdimm->sec.flags' assignment for
the NVDIMM_MASTER type.
Cc
097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite
support")
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c
index 8f3971c..4b8015
it also has a typo: in one occasion, 'nvdimm->sec.ext_state'
assignment is replaced with 'nvdimm->sec.flags' assignment for
the NVDIMM_MASTER type.
Cc: Dan Williams
Fixes: d78c620a2e82 ("libnvdimm/security: Introduce a 'frozen' attribute")
Signed-off-by
Hi, Naoya,
What is the status of the patches?
Is there anything I need to do from my end ?
Regards,
-jane
On 8/6/2019 10:25 AM, Jane Chu wrote:
Change in v4:
- remove trailing white space
Changes in v3:
- move **tk cleanup to its own patch
Changes in v2:
- move 'tk' a
Hi, Bruce, Dan,
This patch took care the panic issue.
thanks,
-jane
On 8/21/19 7:12 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
Probably just needs the following.
I've been slow to get some bugfixes upstream, sorry--I'll go send a pull
request now
--b.
commit 78e70e780b28
Author: He Zhe
Date: Tue Aug
Hi, Dan,
On 8/20/19 8:48 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 6:39 PM wrote:
Hi,
Apology if there is a better channel reporting the issue, if so, please
let me know.
I just saw below regression in 5.3-rc5 kernel, but not in 5.2-rc7 or
earlier kernels.
Is the error stable enough
Hi,
Apology if there is a better channel reporting the issue, if so, please
let me know.
I just saw below regression in 5.3-rc5 kernel, but not in 5.2-rc7 or
earlier kernels.
[ 3533.659787] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
383e202000
[ 3533.659903] Memory failure: 0
21
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of
failure to unmap corrupted page
=> to deliver SIGKILL
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory
corruption
=> to deliver SIGBUS
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Suggested-by: Naoya Ho
Hi, Naoya,
Thanks a lot! v4 on the way. :)
-jane
On 8/1/2019 2:06 AM, Naoya Horiguchi wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 04:01:40PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
add_to_kill() expects the first 'tk' to be pre-allocated, it makes
subsequent allocations on need basis, this makes the code a bit
he SIGKILL
if "tk->addr == -EFAULT", since the code returns early.
Incorporated Noaya's suggestion, also, skip VMAs where
"tk->size_shift == 0" for zone device page, and deliver SIGBUS
when "tk->size_shift != 0" so the payload is helpful;
- ad
add_to_kill() expects the first 'tk' to be pre-allocated, it makes
subsequent allocations on need basis, this makes the code a bit
difficult to read. Move all the allocation internal to add_to_kill()
and drop the **tk argument.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
mm/memory-fail
add_to_kill() expects the first 'tk' to be pre-allocated, it makes
subsequent allocations on need basis, this makes the code a bit
difficult to read. Move all the allocation internal to add_to_kill()
and drop the **tk argument.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
mm/memory-fail
T", since the code returns early.
Incorporated Noaya's suggestion, also, skip VMAs where
"tk->size_shift == 0" for zone device page, and deliver SIGBUS
when "tk->size_shift != 0" so the payload is helpful;
- added Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi
Jane
21
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of
failure to unmap corrupted page
=> to deliver SIGKILL
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory
corruption
=> to deliver SIGBUS
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Suggested-by: Naoya Ho
On 7/24/2019 3:52 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 3:35 PM Jane Chu wrote:
Changes in v2:
- move 'tk' allocations internal to add_to_kill(), suggested by Dan;
Oh, sorry if it wasn't clear, this should move to its own patch that
only does the cleanup, and the
On 7/24/2019 4:43 PM, Naoya Horiguchi wrote:
On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 04:33:23PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
Mmap /dev/dax more than once, then read the poison location using address
from one of the mappings. The other mappings due to not having the page
mapped in will cause SIGKILLs delivered to
21
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of
failure to unmap corrupted page
=> to deliver SIGKILL
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory
corruption
=> to deliver SIGBUS
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
Suggested-by: Naoya Ho
oaya's suggestion, also, skip VMAs where
"tk->size_shift == 0" for zone device page, and deliver SIGBUS
when "tk->size_shift != 0" so the payload is helpful;
- added Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi
Jane Chu (1):
mm/memory-failure: Poison read receives SIGKI
Thank you all for your comments!
I've incorporated them, tested, and have a v2 ready for review.
Thanks!
-jane
On 7/23/19 11:48 PM, Naoya Horiguchi wrote:
Hi Jane, Dan,
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 06:34:35PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 4:49 PM Jane Chu wrote:
Mmap
21
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of
failure to unmap corrupted page
=> to deliver SIGKILL
Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory
corruption
=> to deliver SIGBUS
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
mm/memory-failure.c |
.h| 71 ++
drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c | 24 +++---
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c |4 +
drivers/nvdimm/region.c | 24 +++---
drivers/nvdimm/region_devs.c| 12 ++-
include/linux/device.h |6 ++
14 files changed, 308 insertions(+),
On 5/16/2019 9:48 PM, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
On 05/17/2019 09:38 AM, Jane Chu wrote:
Some user who install SIGBUS handler that does longjmp out
What the longjmp about ? Are you referring to the mechanism of catching the
signal which was registered ?
Yes.
thanks,
-jane
y.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index fc8b517..c4f4bcd 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static int kill_proc(struct t
Thanks Vishal and Naoya!
-jane
On 5/20/2019 3:21 AM, Naoya Horiguchi wrote:
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:18:02AM +0530, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
On 05/17/2019 09:38 AM, Jane Chu wrote:
Some user who install SIGBUS handler that does longjmp out
What the longjmp about ? Are you referring to
y.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 7 ---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index fc8b517..14de5e2 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -216,10 +216,9 @@ static int kill_proc(struct t
On 5/16/2019 2:51 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 9:45 AM Jane Chu wrote:
Hi,
I'm able to reproduce the panic below by running two sets of ndctl
commands that actually serve legitimate purpose in parallel (unlike
the brute force experiment earlier), each set in a indef
Apology for resending in plain text.
-jane
On 5/16/19 9:45 AM, Jane Chu wrote:
Hi,
I'm able to reproduce the panic below by running two sets of ndctl
commands that actually serve legitimate purpose in parallel (unlike
the brute force experiment earlier), each set in a indefinite loop.
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