This is the fourth in a series of eight patches to the BSD Secure Levels LSM. It adds a check for a memory allocation failure condition. Thanks to Vesa-Matti J Kari for pointing out this problem.
Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules/security/seclvl.c =================================================================== --- linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules.orig/security/seclvl.c 2005-02-03 15:37:26.231252048 -0600 +++ linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules/security/seclvl.c 2005-02-03 15:39:35.786556648 -0600 @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len) { - char *pgVirtAddr; + char *pg_virt_addr; struct crypto_tfm *tfm; struct scatterlist sg[1]; if (len > PAGE_SIZE) { @@ -327,16 +327,20 @@ } // Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries // and scatterlists. - pgVirtAddr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pgVirtAddr); + pg_virt_addr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pg_virt_addr) { + seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR "%s: Out of memory\n", __FUNCTION__); + return -ENOMEM; + } + sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pg_virt_addr); sg[0].offset = 0; sg[0].length = len; - strncpy(pgVirtAddr, plaintext, len); + strncpy(pg_virt_addr, plaintext, len); crypto_digest_init(tfm); crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1); crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash); crypto_free_tfm(tfm); - free_page((unsigned long)pgVirtAddr); + free_page((unsigned long)pg_virt_addr); return 0; }