Re: [PATCH] device-dax: map dax memory as decrypted in CoCo guests

2024-09-10 Thread Gupta, Pankaj
On 9/10/2024 3:00 PM, Gupta, Pankaj wrote: On 8/26/2024 11:35 PM, Kevin Loughlin wrote: How can I test this? Can I test it with virtio-pmem device? Correct. Assuming the CoCo guest accesses some virtio-pmem device in devdax mode, mmapping() this virtio-pmem device's memory region results in th

Re: [PATCH] device-dax: map dax memory as decrypted in CoCo guests

2024-09-10 Thread Gupta, Pankaj
On 8/26/2024 11:35 PM, Kevin Loughlin wrote: How can I test this? Can I test it with virtio-pmem device? Correct. Assuming the CoCo guest accesses some virtio-pmem device in devdax mode, mmapping() this virtio-pmem device's memory region results in the guest and host reading the same (plaintext

Re: [PATCH] device-dax: map dax memory as decrypted in CoCo guests

2024-08-26 Thread Kevin Loughlin
> How can I test this? Can I test it with virtio-pmem device? Correct. Assuming the CoCo guest accesses some virtio-pmem device in devdax mode, mmapping() this virtio-pmem device's memory region results in the guest and host reading the same (plaintext) values from the region. > > Thanks, > Pan

Re: [PATCH] device-dax: map dax memory as decrypted in CoCo guests

2024-08-23 Thread Gupta, Pankaj
Confidential Computing (CoCo) guests encrypt private memory by default. DAX memory regions allow a guest to bypass its own (private) page cache and instead use host memory, which is not private to the guest. Commit 867400af90f1 ("mm/memremap.c: map FS_DAX device memory as decrypted") only ensures

[PATCH] device-dax: map dax memory as decrypted in CoCo guests

2024-08-14 Thread Kevin Loughlin
Confidential Computing (CoCo) guests encrypt private memory by default. DAX memory regions allow a guest to bypass its own (private) page cache and instead use host memory, which is not private to the guest. Commit 867400af90f1 ("mm/memremap.c: map FS_DAX device memory as decrypted") only ensures