Re: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-19 Thread Roland Eggner
On 2012-11-19 Monday at 10:14 -0800 Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 4:39 PM, Kay Sievers wrote: > > On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 1:27 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman > > wrote: > >> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 04:20:16PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >>> Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec n

Re: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-19 Thread Kees Cook
On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 4:39 PM, Kay Sievers wrote: > On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 1:27 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman > wrote: >> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 04:20:16PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >>> Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This >>> protects from the case of a privileged

Re: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-16 Thread Kay Sievers
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 1:27 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 04:20:16PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This >> protects from the case of a privileged process having an arbitrary file >> write flaw and an argume

Re: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-16 Thread Kees Cook
On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 4:27 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 04:20:16PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This >> protects from the case of a privileged process having an arbitrary file >> write flaw and an argume

Re: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-16 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 04:20:16PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This > protects from the case of a privileged process having an arbitrary file > write flaw and an argumentless arbitrary execution (i.e. it would lack > the ability to r

[PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid

2012-11-16 Thread Kees Cook
Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This protects from the case of a privileged process having an arbitrary file write flaw and an argumentless arbitrary execution (i.e. it would lack the ability to run "mount -o remount,exec,suid /dev"), with a system that already h