On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 01:17:44PM -0500, Rik van Riel wrote:
> On 02/20/2014 01:14 PM, Dave Jones wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > > In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
> > > memory that has just been reallocated
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 01:14:40PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
> > memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
> > potential
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 01:14:40PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
potential security
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 01:17:44PM -0500, Rik van Riel wrote:
On 02/20/2014 01:14 PM, Dave Jones wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new
On 02/20/2014 01:14 PM, Dave Jones wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
> > memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
> > potential security issues.
> >
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
> memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
> potential security issues.
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kref.h
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
potential security issues.
Close off those potential security holes by terminating the current
thread when kref encounters such a race condition or
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
potential security issues.
Close off those potential security holes by terminating the current
thread when kref encounters such a race condition or
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
potential security issues.
diff --git a/include/linux/kref.h
On 02/20/2014 01:14 PM, Dave Jones wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
potential security issues.
diff
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