[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (v3, against firstfloor tree)

2007-05-02 Thread Jan Beulich
x86: tighten kernel image page access rights On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. Version

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (v3, against firstfloor tree)

2007-05-02 Thread Jan Beulich
x86: tighten kernel image page access rights On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. Version

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (v2, against firstfloor tree)

2007-04-02 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. Compared to the first version, this one prevents

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (v2, against firstfloor tree)

2007-04-02 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. Compared to the first version, this one prevents

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 15:49, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 29.03.07 14:22 >>> > >On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead > >> of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 29.03.07 14:22 >>> >On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead >> of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. >> >> On i386 and x86-64 (under

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: > On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead > of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. > > On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table > can also be

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. (Not sure what the symbol 'stext' is good for; can it

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 09:17, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 28.03.07 21:07 >>> > > > >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU > >> + /* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ > >> + if (num_possible_cpus() <= 1) > > > >It would be better to temporarily change

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 28.03.07 21:07 >>> > >> +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU >> +/* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ >> +if (num_possible_cpus() <= 1) > >It would be better to temporarily change the pages where the alternatives >are applied while that is

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
Andi Kleen [EMAIL PROTECTED] 28.03.07 21:07 +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU +/* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ +if (num_possible_cpus() = 1) It would be better to temporarily change the pages where the alternatives are applied while that is done and keep it

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 09:17, Jan Beulich wrote: Andi Kleen [EMAIL PROTECTED] 28.03.07 21:07 +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU + /* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ + if (num_possible_cpus() = 1) It would be better to temporarily change the pages where the

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. (Not sure what the symbol 'stext' is good for; can it

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Jan Beulich
Andi Kleen [EMAIL PROTECTED] 29.03.07 14:22 On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights (re-diff against firstfloor tree)

2007-03-29 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thursday 29 March 2007 15:49, Jan Beulich wrote: Andi Kleen [EMAIL PROTECTED] 29.03.07 14:22 On Thursday 29 March 2007 14:01, Jan Beulich wrote: On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern.

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-28 Thread Andi Kleen
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU > + /* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ > + if (num_possible_cpus() <= 1) It would be better to temporarily change the pages where the alternatives are applied while that is done and keep it otherwise ro -Andi - To unsubscribe from

Re: [PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-28 Thread Andi Kleen
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU + /* It must still be possible to apply SMP alternatives. */ + if (num_possible_cpus() = 1) It would be better to temporarily change the pages where the alternatives are applied while that is done and keep it otherwise ro -Andi - To unsubscribe from this

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-26 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. On x86-64, in addition to that, also make sure that

[PATCH] x86: tighten kernel image page access rights

2007-03-26 Thread Jan Beulich
On x86-64, kernel memory freed after init can be entirely unmapped instead of just getting 'poisoned' by overwriting with a debug pattern. On i386 and x86-64 (under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA), kernel text and bug table can also be write-protected. On x86-64, in addition to that, also make sure that