Re: [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-09-21 Thread Lendacky, Thomas
On 09/21/2018 12:14 PM, Tim Chen wrote: > On 09/21/2018 08:44 AM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote: > > >> +if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) >> +x86_spec_ctrl_base |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); >> + >> +x86_spec_ctrl_base |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); >> >> wrmsrl(MSR

Re: [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-09-21 Thread Tim Chen
On 09/21/2018 08:44 AM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote: > + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) > + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); > + > + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); > > wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); > } > Should this part

Re: [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-09-21 Thread Lendacky, Thomas
On 09/20/2018 04:38 PM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote: > On 09/19/2018 04:35 PM, Tim Chen wrote: >> This patchset provides an option to apply IBPB and STIBP mitigation >> to only non-dumpable processes. >> >> Jiri's patch to harden spectre_v2 makes IBPB and STIBP available for >> general spectre v2 app to

Re: [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-09-20 Thread Lendacky, Thomas
On 09/19/2018 04:35 PM, Tim Chen wrote: > This patchset provides an option to apply IBPB and STIBP mitigation > to only non-dumpable processes. > > Jiri's patch to harden spectre_v2 makes IBPB and STIBP available for > general spectre v2 app to app mitigation. IBPB will be issued for > switching

[PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection

2018-09-19 Thread Tim Chen
This patchset provides an option to apply IBPB and STIBP mitigation to only non-dumpable processes. Jiri's patch to harden spectre_v2 makes IBPB and STIBP available for general spectre v2 app to app mitigation. IBPB will be issued for switching to an app that's not ptraceable by the previous app