* Andrew Morton ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Jeffrey Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
> > filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
> > infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform
On Fri, 2005-03-04 at 21:28 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Jeffrey Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
> > filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
> > infrastructure to allow the
On Fri, 2005-03-04 at 21:28 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
Jeffrey Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to
* Andrew Morton ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Jeffrey Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own
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Hash: SHA1
Andrew Morton wrote:
> Jeffrey Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
>> filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
>> infrastructure to allow the
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Hash: SHA1
Andrew Morton wrote:
Jeffrey Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to
Jeffrey Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
> filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
> infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
OK, thanks. I'll assume
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
Changes:
- Post-operations for calls that generally instantiate the dentry
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
Changes:
- Post-operations for calls that generally instantiate the dentry but
Jeffrey Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
OK, thanks. I'll assume that the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Jeffrey Mahoney wrote:
> This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
> filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
> infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
> @@
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Hash: SHA1
Jeffrey Mahoney wrote:
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
@@
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode->i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
diff -ruNpX dontdiff
This patch adds an S_PRIVATE flag to inode-i_flags to mark an inode as
filesystem-internal. As such, it should be excepted from the security
infrastructure to allow the filesystem to perform its own access control.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
diff -ruNpX dontdiff
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