Since 902c098a3 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") we have protected entropy_count only with cmpxchg, not the
lock.  In 10b3a32d2 ("random: fix accounting race condition") we
put a cmpxchg-retry loop around most of the logic in account(),
but the enforcement of the 'min' parameter stayed outside.

Under concurrent accesses to /dev/urandom this can suffer a race
that defeats our "catastrophic reseed" measures so that our
reseeding isn't effective.  If accesses to /dev/urandom and
/dev/random are interleaved in the wrong pattern, we could go
indefinitely long without a successful catastrophic reseed of
/dev/urandom, even while consuming an indefinite amount of entropy
in ineffective smaller reseeds.

NB that with or without this bug, if /dev/random is simply
accessed constantly, we can go indefinitely long without any
reseed of /dev/urandom.  So the effect of the bug is not that big.

The race comes when two tasks are in account() on input_pool
and access ->entropy_count in the following order:

             task A                           task B
   if (r->entropy_count / 8
               < min + reserved)
                                   ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count)
                                   cmpxchg
   ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count)
   cmpxchg

where B causes r->entropy_count / 8 to fall below A's
min + reserved but above reserved.  Task A will cheerfully
take r->entropy_count / 8 - reserved bytes from the pool,
even though this is less than min.

Move the "min" check inside the ACCESS_ONCE/cmpxchg loop to
prevent the race.

Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkos...@suse.cz>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <ty...@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Price <pr...@mit.edu>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1bf6bf8..87d3728 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -842,18 +842,17 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t 
nbytes, int min,
 {
        unsigned long flags;
        int wakeup_write = 0;
+       int entropy_count, orig;
 
        BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS);
        DEBUG_ENT("trying to extract %zu bits from %s\n",
                  nbytes * 8, r->name);
 
-       /* Can we pull enough? */
-       if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
+retry:
+       entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+       if (entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
                nbytes = 0;
        } else {
-               int entropy_count, orig;
-retry:
-               entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
                /* If limited, never pull more than available */
                if (r->limit)
                        nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, entropy_count/8 - 
reserved);
-- 
1.8.3.2

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