Provide handlers for PGP-based public-key algorithm signature verification. This does most of the work involved in signature verification as most of it is public-key algorithm agnostic. The public-key verification algorithm itself is just the last little bit and is supplied the complete hash data to process.
This requires glue logic putting on top to make use of it - something the next patch provides. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com> --- security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 3 security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h | 6 + security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile index 35733fc..0c8b8a1 100644 --- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile @@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o pgp_key_parser-y := \ - pgp_public_key.o + pgp_public_key.o \ + pgp_sig_verify.o diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h index 1cda231..6f5b3af 100644 --- a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h +++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h @@ -21,3 +21,9 @@ */ extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pgp_public_key_algorithms[PGP_PUBKEY__LAST]; + +/* + * pgp_pubkey_sig.c + */ +extern struct crypto_sig_verify_context *pgp_pkey_verify_sig_begin( + struct key *crypto_key, const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen); diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9bb949 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +/* PGP public key signature verification [RFC 4880] + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowe...@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGPSIG: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/pgplib.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include "public_key.h" +#include "pgp_parser.h" + +static const struct { + enum pkey_hash_algo algo : 8; +} pgp_pubkey_hash[PGP_HASH__LAST] = { + [PGP_HASH_MD5].algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5, + [PGP_HASH_SHA1].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1, + [PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160].algo = PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160, + [PGP_HASH_SHA256].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256, + [PGP_HASH_SHA384].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384, + [PGP_HASH_SHA512].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512, + [PGP_HASH_SHA224].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224, +}; + +static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, + const void *data, size_t datalen); +static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, + const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); +static void pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx); + +struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context { + struct pgp_parse_context pgp; + struct pgp_sig_parameters params; +}; + +static int pgp_pkey_parse_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context, + enum pgp_packet_tag type, + u8 headerlen, + const u8 *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context *ctx = + container_of(context, struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context, pgp); + + return pgp_parse_sig_params(&data, &datalen, &ctx->params); +} + +/* + * Begin the process of verifying a DSA signature. + * + * This involves allocating the hash into which first the data and then the + * metadata will be put, and parsing the signature to check that it matches the + * key. + */ +struct crypto_sig_verify_context *pgp_pkey_verify_sig_begin( + struct key *crypto_key, const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen) +{ + struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context p; + struct public_key_signature *sig; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + const struct public_key *key = crypto_key->payload.data; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + int ret; + + kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(crypto_key), siglen); + + if (!key) { + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no public key]"); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + } + + p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE); + p.pgp.process_packet = pgp_pkey_parse_signature; + ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (p.params.pubkey_algo >= PGP_PUBKEY__LAST || + !pgp_public_key_algorithms[p.params.pubkey_algo]) { + pr_debug("Unsupported public key algorithm %u\n", + p.params.pubkey_algo); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); + } + + if (pgp_public_key_algorithms[p.params.pubkey_algo] != key->algo) { + kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [wrong pk algo]"); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); + } + + if (!(key->capabilities & PKEY_CAN_VERIFY)) { + kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [key can't verify]"); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); + } + + if (p.params.hash_algo >= PGP_HASH__LAST || + !pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]) { + pr_debug("Unsupported hash algorithm %u\n", + p.params.hash_algo); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); + } + + pr_debug("Signature generated with %s hash\n", + pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]); + + if (memcmp(&p.params.issuer, key->key_id, 8) != 0) { + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [wrong key ID]"); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + } + + if (p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_BINARY_DOCUMENT_SIG && + p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_STANDALONE_SIG) { + /* We don't want to canonicalise */ + kleave(" = -EOPNOTSUPP [canon]"); + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + } + + /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how + * big the hash operational data will be. + */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT ? + ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our + * context data. + */ + sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig) { + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + + sig->base.key = crypto_key; + sig->base.add_data = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data; + sig->base.end = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end; + sig->base.cancel = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel; + sig->pkey_hash_algo = pgp_pubkey_hash[p.params.hash_algo].algo; + sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size; + sig->digest_size = digest_size; + sig->hash.tfm = tfm; + sig->hash.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sig->hash); + if (ret < 0) { + crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm); + kfree(sig); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + key_get(sig->base.key); + kleave(" = %p", sig); + return &sig->base; +} + +/* + * Load data into the hash + */ +static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, + const void *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = + container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); + + return crypto_shash_update(&sig->hash, data, datalen); +} + +struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context { + struct pgp_parse_context pgp; + const struct public_key *key; + struct public_key_signature *sig; +}; + +/* + * Extract required metadata from the signature packet and add what we need to + * to the hash. + */ +static int pgp_pkey_digest_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context, + enum pgp_packet_tag type, + u8 headerlen, + const u8 *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context *ctx = + container_of(context, struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context, pgp); + enum pgp_signature_version version; + int i; + + kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen); + + version = *data; + if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3) { + /* We just include an excerpt of the metadata from a V3 + * signature. + */ + crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data + 1, 5); + data += sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet); + datalen -= sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet); + } else if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4) { + /* We add the whole metadata header and some of the hashed data + * for a V4 signature, plus a trailer. + */ + size_t hashedsz, unhashedsz; + u8 trailer[6]; + + hashedsz = 4 + 2 + (data[4] << 8) + data[5]; + crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data, hashedsz); + + trailer[0] = version; + trailer[1] = 0xffU; + trailer[2] = hashedsz >> 24; + trailer[3] = hashedsz >> 16; + trailer[4] = hashedsz >> 8; + trailer[5] = hashedsz; + + crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, trailer, 6); + data += hashedsz; + datalen -= hashedsz; + + unhashedsz = 2 + (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; + data += unhashedsz; + datalen -= unhashedsz; + } + + if (datalen <= 2) { + kleave(" = -EBADMSG"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + /* There's a quick check on the hash available. */ + ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[0] = *data++; + ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[1] = *data++; + datalen -= 2; + + /* And then the cryptographic data, which we'll need for the + * algorithm. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->key->algo->n_sig_mpi; i++) { + unsigned int remaining = datalen; + if (remaining == 0) { + pr_debug("short %zu mpi %d\n", datalen, i); + return -EBADMSG; + } + ctx->sig->mpi[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(data, &remaining); + if (!ctx->sig->mpi[i]) + return -ENOMEM; + data += remaining; + datalen -= remaining; + } + + if (datalen != 0) { + kleave(" = -EBADMSG [trailer %zu]", datalen); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + kleave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * The data is now all loaded into the hash; load the metadata, finalise the + * hash and perform the verification step. + */ +static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, + const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = + container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); + const struct public_key *key = sig->base.key->payload.data; + struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context p; + int ret; + + kenter(""); + + /* Firstly we add metadata, starting with some of the data from the + * signature packet */ + p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE); + p.pgp.process_packet = pgp_pkey_digest_signature; + p.key = key; + p.sig = sig; + ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free_ctx; + + crypto_shash_final(&sig->hash, sig->digest); + + ret = key->algo->verify(key, sig); + +error_free_ctx: + pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(ctx); + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Cancel an in-progress data loading + */ +static void pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = + container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); + int i; + + kenter(""); + + /* !!! Do we need to tell the crypto layer to cancel too? */ + crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm); + key_put(sig->base.key); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->mpi); i++) + mpi_free(sig->mpi[i]); + kfree(sig); + + kleave(""); +} -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/