On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 9:41 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 09:25:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 8:58 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
>
>> > Would it be worth verifying that all kernel mappings are UXN, too?
>> >
>> > ARMv8 allows execute-only mappings, and a !
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 09:25:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 8:58 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > Would it be worth verifying that all kernel mappings are UXN, too?
> >
> > ARMv8 allows execute-only mappings, and a !UXN mapping could result in an
> > info
> > leak (e.g. point
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 8:58 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 02:32:57PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
>> @@ -219,6 +223,15 @@ static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned
>> long addr, unsigned level,
>> unsigned long delta;
>>
>> if (st->current_
On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 02:32:57PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
> @@ -219,6 +223,15 @@ static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long
> addr, unsigned level,
> unsigned long delta;
>
> if (st->current_prot) {
> + if (st->check_wx &&
> +
Hi,
On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 02:32:57PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
> Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk. x86
> has an option to walk the page tables and dump any bad pages.
> (See e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")). Add a similar
> implementation for arm64.
>
>
Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk. x86
has an option to walk the page tables and dump any bad pages.
(See e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")). Add a similar
implementation for arm64.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug| 28 +++
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