On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 02:56:45PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Wed, 2 May 2018 09:33:40 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
>
> > Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
> > enough entropy then '(ptrval)' is printed. This makes debugging
> > early stage stack
On Wed, 2 May 2018 09:33:40 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
> Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
> enough entropy then '(ptrval)' is printed. This makes debugging
> early stage stack traces difficult. We can relax the requirement for
> cryptographically
On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 6:45 PM Steven Rostedt wrote:
> Except for where hardware vendors control what random bytes you
> actually get ;-)
In which case you should just use "nordrand" and be done with it.
.. and you might also want to reconsider your other life choices, because
honestly, there a
On Tue, May 01, 2018 at 09:45:07PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Wed, 2 May 2018 11:27:58 +1000
> tcharding wrote:
>
> > On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 01:02:34AM +, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 4:34 PM Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > This option should NOT
On Wed, 2 May 2018 11:27:58 +1000
tcharding wrote:
> On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 01:02:34AM +, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 4:34 PM Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> >
> >
> > > This option should NOT be enabled on production kernels.
> >
> > I think with your fixes to get_ran
On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 01:02:34AM +, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 4:34 PM Tobin C. Harding wrote:
>
>
> > This option should NOT be enabled on production kernels.
>
> I think with your fixes to get_random_bytes_arch(), it's perfectly fine to
> use on production kernels (a
On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 4:34 PM Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> This option should NOT be enabled on production kernels.
I think with your fixes to get_random_bytes_arch(), it's perfectly fine to
use on production kernels (and doesn't even need a kernel command line
option).
It was only with the "use
Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
enough entropy then '(ptrval)' is printed. This makes debugging
early stage stack traces difficult. We can relax the requirement for
cryptographically secure hashing when debugging while still maintaining
pointer hashing b
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