From: Julien Thierry <julien.thie...@arm.com>
Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream.
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.
This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.
Porting commit c2f0ad4fc089cff8 ("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use
of the current addr_limit").
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thie...@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+ker...@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.l...@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 4140be431087..7d19584f5c39 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ extern int __put_user_bad(void);
static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
{
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+ * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+ */
+ dsb(nsh);
+ isb();
+
modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER);
}
--
2.17.1
