From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com>
commit 39226ef02bfb43248b7db12a4fdccb39d95318e3 upstream.
MDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk
whenever SMT first gets enabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkos...@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -646,6 +646,9 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi
static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
}
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
@@ -666,6 +669,8 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
}
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more
details.\n"
+
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -689,6 +694,8 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
switch (mds_mitigation) {
case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+ if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
update_mds_branch_idle();
break;
case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
@@ -1069,6 +1076,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
}
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
