Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-03-01 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 03:38:20PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 01:31:51AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 04:36:02PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 9:22 AM, Jann Horn wrote: > > > > I think it sounds good from a sec

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-02-29 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 01:31:51AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 04:36:02PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 9:22 AM, Jann Horn wrote: > > > I think it sounds good from a security perspective. > > > > I'm a bit late to the game, but I have a ques

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-01-28 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 04:36:02PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 9:22 AM, Jann Horn wrote: > > I think it sounds good from a security perspective. > > I'm a bit late to the game, but I have a question: why should this be > keyed to the *root* uid of the namespace in part

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-01-27 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 9:22 AM, Jann Horn wrote: > I think it sounds good from a security perspective. I'm a bit late to the game, but I have a question: why should this be keyed to the *root* uid of the namespace in particular? Certainly if user foo trusts the cap bits on some file, then user

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-01-27 Thread Jann Horn
On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 10:08:15AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 01:48:16PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:21:16PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > > > > "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > > > > > >

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2016-01-27 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 01:48:16PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:21:16PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > > > "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > > > > > > > A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2015-12-04 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > > > A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as root, > > perhaps setuid-root, choose a desired capability set, set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, > > then change uid to non-root. A simpler way to achiev

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2015-11-30 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 05:08:34PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > > > A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as root, > > perhaps setuid-root, choose a desired capability set, set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, > > then change uid to non-root. A simpl

Re: [PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2015-11-30 Thread Eric W. Biederman
"Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as root, > perhaps setuid-root, choose a desired capability set, set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, > then change uid to non-root. A simpler way to achieve this is to set file > capabilities on a not-setuid-root bin

[PATCH RFC] Introduce new security.nscapability xattr

2015-11-30 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as root, perhaps setuid-root, choose a desired capability set, set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, then change uid to non-root. A simpler way to achieve this is to set file capabilities on a not-setuid-root binary. However, when installing a pac