From: Ira Weiny <ira.we...@intel.com> Future Intel CPUS will support Protection Key Supervisor (PKS).
Update the protection key documentation to cover pkeys on supervisor pages. Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.we...@intel.com> --- Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 81 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst index ec575e72d0b2..5ac400a5a306 100644 --- a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst +++ b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst @@ -4,25 +4,33 @@ Memory Protection Keys ====================== -Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a feature -which is found on Intel's Skylake (and later) "Scalable Processor" -Server CPUs. It will be available in future non-server Intel parts -and future AMD processors. - -For anyone wishing to test or use this feature, it is available in -Amazon's EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu -17.04 image. - Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables -when an application changes protection domains. It works by -dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a -"protection key", giving 16 possible keys. +when an application changes protection domains. + +PKeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which is found on Intel's Skylake "Scalable +Processor" Server CPUs and later. And It will be available in future +non-server Intel parts and future AMD processors. + +Future Intel processors will support Protection Keys for Supervisor pages +(PKS). + +For anyone wishing to test or use user space pkeys, it is available in Amazon's +EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu 17.04 image. + +pkes work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to +a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys. User and Supervisor pages are +treated separately. -There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate -bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU -register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each -thread a different set of protections from every other thread. +Protections for each page are controlled with per CPU registers for each type +of page User and Supervisor. Each of these 32 bit register stores two separate +bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. + +For Userspace the register is user-accessible (rdpkru/wrpkru). For +Supervisor, the register (MSR_IA32_PKRS) is accessible only to the kernel. + +Being a CPU register, pkes are inherently thread-local, potentially giving +each thread an independent set of protections from every other thread. There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode, @@ -30,8 +38,11 @@ even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on instruction fetches. -Syscalls -======== +For kernel space rdmsr/wrmsr are used to access the kernel MSRs. + + +Syscalls for user space keys +============================ There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:: @@ -98,3 +109,37 @@ with a read():: The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when the plain mprotect() permissions are violated. + + +Kernel API for PKS support +========================== + +PKS is intended to harden against unwanted access to kernel pages. But it does +not completely restrict access under all conditions. For example the MSR +setting is not saved/restored during irqs. Thus the use of PKS is a mitigation +strategy rather than a form of strict security. + +The following calls are used to allocate, use, and deallocate a pkey which +defines a 'protection domain' within the kernel. Setting a pkey value in a +supervisor mapping adds that mapping to the protection domain. Then calls can be +used to enable/disable read and/or write access to all of the pages mapped with +that key: + + int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user); + #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) + #define _PAGE_KEY(pkey) + int pks_update_protection(int pkey, unsigned long protection); + void pks_key_free(int pkey); + +In-kernel users must be prepared to set PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY() permission in the +page table entries for the mappings they want to ptorect. + +WARNING: It is imperative that callers check for errors from pks_key_alloc() +because pkeys are a limited resource and so callers should be prepared to work +without PKS support. + +For admins a debugfs interface provides a list of the current keys in use at: + + /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pks_keys_allocated + +Some example code can be found in lib/pks/pks_test.c -- 2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9
