On 06.10.2020 21:37, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
>>
>> On 06.10.2020 01:56, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:43 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote:
> This is the second version of the heap
On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
>
> On 06.10.2020 01:56, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:43 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
> >> On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote:
> >>> This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux
> >>> kernel.
On 06.10.2020 01:56, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:43 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
>> On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote:
>>> This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux
>>> kernel. I performed a deeper evaluation of its security properties and
>>>
On Tue, 6 Oct 2020, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> > the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things
> > with a probably much smaller performance
On Mon, 5 Oct 2020, Kees Cook wrote:
> > TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, but if forcing that on by default would enhance security
> > by a measurable amount, it wouldn't be a terribly hard sell ...
>
> Isn't the "easy" version of this already controlled by slab_merge? (i.e.
> do not share same-sized/flagged
It will reuse the memory for other things when the whole slab is freed
though. Not really realistic to change that without it being backed by
virtual memory along with higher-level management of regions to avoid
intense fragmentation and metadata waste. It would depend a lot on
having much
On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 4:09 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 01:44:14AM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> > > the heap allocator layer, you could do
On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 01:44:14AM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> > the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things
> > with a probably much
On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:44 AM Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> > the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things
> > with a probably much smaller
On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 12:56:33AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> It seems to me like, if you want to make UAF exploitation harder at
> the heap allocator layer, you could do somewhat more effective things
> with a probably much smaller performance budget. Things like
> preventing the reallocation of
On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:43 PM Alexander Popov wrote:
> On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote:
> > This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux
> > kernel. I performed a deeper evaluation of its security properties and
> > developed new features like quarantine
Hello! I have some performance numbers. Please see below.
On 29.09.2020 21:35, Alexander Popov wrote:
> Hello everyone! Requesting for your comments.
>
> This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux
> kernel. I performed a deeper evaluation of its security properties
Hello everyone! Requesting for your comments.
This is the second version of the heap quarantine prototype for the Linux
kernel. I performed a deeper evaluation of its security properties and
developed new features like quarantine randomization and integration with
init_on_free. That is fun! See
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