From: Matthew Garrett <mj...@srcf.ucam.org>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mj...@google.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelg...@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
cc: linux-...@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c      | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c           | 14 ++++++++++++--
 drivers/pci/syscall.c        |  4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 965c72104150..396c1a90c0e1 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -906,6 +906,11 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct 
kobject *kobj,
        unsigned int size = count;
        loff_t init_off = off;
        u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
 
        if (off > dev->cfg_size)
                return 0;
@@ -1167,6 +1172,11 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, 
struct bin_attribute *attr,
        int bar = (unsigned long)attr->private;
        enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
        struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
 
        if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
                return -EINVAL;
@@ -1243,6 +1253,12 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, 
struct kobject *kobj,
                                     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
                                     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
+
        return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index fe7fe678965b..5495537c60c2 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include "pci.h"
 
@@ -115,7 +116,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const 
char __user *buf,
        struct pci_dev *dev = PDE_DATA(ino);
        int pos = *ppos;
        int size = dev->cfg_size;
-       int cnt;
+       int cnt, ret;
+
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
 
        if (pos >= size)
                return 0;
@@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned 
int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
        int ret = 0;
 
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
+
        switch (cmd) {
        case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
                ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -238,7 +247,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct 
vm_area_struct *vma)
        struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
        int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
+           security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS))
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index d96626c614f5..31e39558d49d 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "pci.h"
@@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned 
long, dfn,
        u32 dword;
        int err = 0;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+           security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS))
                return -EPERM;
 
        dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 304a155a5628..8adbd62b7669 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
        LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
        LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
+       LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
        LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
        LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index a0996f75629f..655fe388e615 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] 
= {
        [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
        [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
        [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
+       [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
        [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
        [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
-- 
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog

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