On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 08:00:46PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 31 Oct 2017 09:41:02 +1100
> "Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
>
>
> > Cool. So I think we need
> >
> > get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
>
> You'll need to add a comment here to describe what ordering the memory
On Tue, 31 Oct 2017 09:41:02 +1100
"Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
> Cool. So I think we need
>
> get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
You'll need to add a comment here to describe what ordering the memory
barrier is used against. That is, somewhere else there's something that
needs to
On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 05:33:22PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Thu, 26 Oct 2017 13:58:38 +1100
> "Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
>
> > > +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key;
> > > +static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
> > > +
> > > +static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_c
On Thu, 26 Oct 2017 13:58:38 +1100
"Tobin C. Harding" wrote:
> > +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key;
> > +static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
> > +
> > +static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
> > +{
> > + get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
>
On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 4:53 AM, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key;
__read_mostly
On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 01:53:56PM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses
> gives a
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses
gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout in memory.
We can
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