Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2021-02-15 Thread Topi Miettinen
On 15.2.2021 14.51, Uladzislau Rezki wrote: On Sat, Feb 13, 2021 at 03:43:39PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: On 13.2.2021 13.55, Uladzislau Rezki wrote: Hello, Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please? -Topi I can review it and help with it. But before that i

Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2021-02-15 Thread Uladzislau Rezki
On Sat, Feb 13, 2021 at 03:43:39PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: > On 13.2.2021 13.55, Uladzislau Rezki wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > > > Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please? > > > > > > -Topi > > > > > I can review it and help with it. But before that i would l

Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2021-02-13 Thread Topi Miettinen
On 13.2.2021 13.55, Uladzislau Rezki wrote: Hello, Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please? -Topi I can review it and help with it. But before that i would like to clarify if such "randomization" is something that you can not leave? This happens to interest

Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2021-02-13 Thread Uladzislau Rezki
> Hello, > > Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please? > > -Topi > I can review it and help with it. But before that i would like to clarify if such "randomization" is something that you can not leave? For example on 32bit system vmalloc space is limited, such ra

Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2021-02-13 Thread Topi Miettinen
Hello, Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please? -Topi On 12.12.2020 19.56, Topi Miettinen wrote: Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses. With new kernel boot parameter 'randomi

[PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

2020-12-12 Thread Topi Miettinen
Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses. With new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to guess for attackers. Also module