Implement a mechanism that allows tasks to conditionally flush their L1D cache (mitigation mechanism suggested in 2). The previous posts of these patches were sent for inclusion (see 3) and were not included due to the concern for the need for additional checks, those checks were:
1. Implement this mechanism only for CPUs affected by the L1TF bug 2. Disable the software fallback 3. Provide an override to disable this mechanism completely The patches support a use case where the entire system is not in non SMT mode, but rather a few CPUs can have their SMT turned off and processes that want to opt-in are expected to run on non SMT cores. This gives the administrator complete control over setting up the mitigation for the issue. In addition, the administrator has a boot time override (l1d_flush_out=off) to turn of the mechanism completely. To implement these efficiently, a new per cpu view of whether the core is in SMT mode or not is implemented in patch 1. The code is refactored in patch 2 so that the existing code can allow for other speculation related checks when switching mm between tasks, this mechanism has not changed since the last post. The ability to flush L1D for tasks if the TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH bit is set and the task has context switched out of a non SMT core is provided by patch 3. Hooks for the user space API, for this feature to be invoked via prctl are provided in patch 4, along with the checks described above (1, 2, and 3). The checks are: a. If the CPU is affected by L1TF b. Hardware L1D flush mechanism is available c. The task opting in has it's affinity set to only non SMT cores. Documentation updates are in patch 5, with updates on l1d_flush, the prctl changes and updates to the kernel-parameters (l1d_flush_out). Balbir Singh (5): Add a per-cpu view of SMT state x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases x86/mm: Optionally flush L1D on context switch prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctl Documentation: Add L1D flushing Documentation References: [1] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/snoop-assisted-l1-data-sampling [2] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-snoop-assisted-l1-data-sampling [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/2/1150 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst | 70 ++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 54 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 11 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 104 +++++++++++++----- include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 12 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst -- 2.17.1