On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 15:41:20 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 14:17, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
> > Halil Pasic wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
> >> Pierre Morel wrote:
> >>
> >int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_d
On 2020-06-16 14:17, Cornelia Huck wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
Halil Pasic wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
{
int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
@@ -179,6 +184,10
On 2020-06-16 14:20, Cornelia Huck wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
return is_prot_vir
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:35:19 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 08:55, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> >> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
> > On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
> > Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> @@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> >>return is_prot_virt_guest();
> >> }
> >>
> >> +in
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
Halil Pasic wrote:
> On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
> Pierre Morel wrote:
>
> > >> int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
> > >> {
> > >> int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
> > >> @@ -179,6 +184,10 @@ int virtio_fi
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
> >> {
> >>int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
> >> @@ -179,6 +184,10 @@ int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device
> >> *dev)
> >>if (!virtio_has_fea
On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already
accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is
the ability to reject.
An architecture protecting the g
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already
accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is
the ability to reject.
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> acce
On 2020-06-16 08:55, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the arch
On 2020-06-16 08:22, Jason Wang wrote:
On 2020/6/15 下午8:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture t
On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
> use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
>
> Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
> without V
On 2020/6/15 下午8:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_I
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel
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