On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 7:03 PM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Josh Poimboeuf writes:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:34:25AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:52 PM, Michael Ellerman
>>> wrote:
>>> > Kees Cook writes:
>>> >
>>> >> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>>
David Laight writes:
> From: Josh Poimboeuf
>> Sent: 22 July 2016 18:46
>> >
>> > e.g. then if the pointer was in the thread_info, the second test would
>> > fail, triggering the protection.
>>
>> FWIW, this won't work right on x86 after Andy's
>> CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK patches get merged.
>
From: Josh Poimboeuf
> Sent: 22 July 2016 18:46
..
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
> > >> + * stack frame (if possible).
> > >> + *
> > >> + * 0: not at all on the stack
> > >> + * 1: fully within a valid stack frame
> > >> + * 2: fully o
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:34:25AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:52 PM, Michael Ellerman
> wrote:
> > Kees Cook writes:
> >
> >> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> >> new file mode 100644
> >> index ..e4bf4e7ccdf6
> >> --- /dev/null
> >> +++ b/mm/user
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:52 PM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Kees Cook writes:
>
>> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index ..e4bf4e7ccdf6
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
> ...
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Checks if a given pointer
On 07/20/2016 03:24 AM, Balbir Singh wrote:
On Tue, 2016-07-19 at 11:48 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
This doesn't work when copying CMA allocated memory since CMA purposely
allocates larger than a page b
On Tue, 2016-07-19 at 11:48 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> >
> > On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > This doesn't work when copying CMA allocated memory since CMA purposely
> > allocates larger than a page block size without setting
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:52 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
>> On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> +static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned
>>> long n,
>>> + bool to_user
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>>An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a
>> secondary
>>linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one
>> virtual
>>kernel address that poin
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Christian Borntraeger
wrote:
> On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger
>> wrote:
>>> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
+config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
+ bool
+ help
>>
On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger
> wrote:
>> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>>> + bool
>>> + help
>>> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary line
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger
wrote:
> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
>> + bool
>> + help
>> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear
>> + mapping of the kernel text. This is
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:52 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
>> is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
>> work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
>> is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
>> work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad
On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING
> + bool
> + help
> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear
> + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel
> + text exposures are not visible un
On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non
On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
Th
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