[RFC][PATCH] apparmor: Enforce progressively tighter permissions for no_new_privs

2021-01-20 Thread Eric W. Biederman
The current understanding of apparmor with respect to no_new_privs is at odds with how no_new_privs is implemented and understood by the rest of the kernel. The documentation of no_new_privs states: > With ``no_new_privs`` set, ``execve()`` promises not to grant the > privilege to do anything

Re: [RFC][PATCH] apparmor: Enforce progressively tighter permissions for no_new_privs

2021-01-20 Thread John Johansen
On 1/20/21 2:56 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > TL;DR selinux and apparmor ignore no_new_privs > > What? > AppArmor does not ignore no_new_privs. Its mediation is bounded and it doesn't grant anything that wasn't allowed when NNP was set. > > John Johansen writes: > >> On

Re: [RFC][PATCH] apparmor: Enforce progressively tighter permissions for no_new_privs

2021-01-20 Thread Eric W. Biederman
TL;DR selinux and apparmor ignore no_new_privs What? John Johansen writes: > On 1/20/21 1:26 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> The current understanding of apparmor with respect to no_new_privs is at >> odds with how no_new_privs is implemented and understood by the rest of >>

Re: [RFC][PATCH] apparmor: Enforce progressively tighter permissions for no_new_privs

2021-01-20 Thread John Johansen
On 1/20/21 1:26 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > The current understanding of apparmor with respect to no_new_privs is at > odds with how no_new_privs is implemented and understood by the rest of > the kernel. > > The documentation of no_new_privs states: >> With ``no_new_privs`` set,

Re: [RFC][PATCH] apparmor: Enforce progressively tighter permissions for no_new_privs

2021-01-20 Thread Eric W. Biederman
This should now Cc the correct email address for James Morris. ebied...@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) writes: > The current understanding of apparmor with respect to no_new_privs is at > odds with how no_new_privs is implemented and understood by the rest of > the kernel. > > The