Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-13 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen writes: > On 03/12/2015 03:35 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: >> On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen wrote: >>> From: Dave Hansen >>> >>> Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are >>> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical >>> information is

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-13 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/12/2015 03:35 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen wrote: >> From: Dave Hansen >> >> Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are >> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical >> information is available. Here is one example:

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-13 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net writes: On 03/12/2015 03:35 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net wrote: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-13 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/12/2015 03:35 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net wrote: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical information is

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-12 Thread Andrew Morton
On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen wrote: > > From: Dave Hansen > > Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are > existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical > information is available. Here is one example: > >

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-12 Thread Andrew Morton
On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:43:21 -0700 Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net wrote: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical information is available. Here is one example:

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen writes: > On 03/09/2015 05:03 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman >> wrote: >>> A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an >>> appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or >>> page

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/09/2015 05:03 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: >> A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an >> appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or >> page ajacencies while not requiring any

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/09/2015 04:08 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > If the concern is to protect against root getting into the kernel the > "trusted_kernel" snake-oil just compile out the pagemap file. Nothing > else is remotely interesting from a mainenance point of view. The paper I linked to showed one

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an > appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or > page ajacencies while not requiring any changes in userspace. > > That way the revealed

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or page ajacencies while not requiring any changes in userspace. That way the revealed pfn and the physcial pfn would be different but you could still use

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Kees Cook writes: > >> On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman >> wrote: >>> Dave Hansen writes: >>> From: Dave Hansen Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Kees Cook writes: > On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: >> Dave Hansen writes: >> >>> From: Dave Hansen >>> >>> Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are >>> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical >>> information is available. Here is

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Dave Hansen writes: > >> From: Dave Hansen >> >> Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are >> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical >> information is available. Here is one example: >> >>

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen writes: > From: Dave Hansen > > Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are > existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical > information is available. Here is one example: > > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf > > If you know

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Dave Hansen wrote: > > From: Dave Hansen > > Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are > existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical > information is available. Here is one example: > >

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net wrote: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical information is available. Here is one example:

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net writes: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical information is available. Here is one example:

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org writes: On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net writes: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net writes: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical information is

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Kees Cook keesc...@chromium.org writes: On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: Dave Hansen d...@sr71.net writes: From: Dave Hansen dave.han...@linux.intel.com Physical addresses are sensitive information. There are existing, known exploits that

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or page ajacencies while not requiring any changes in userspace. That

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or page ajacencies while not requiring any changes in userspace. That way the revealed pfn and the physcial pfn would be different but you could still use

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Dave Hansen dave.han...@intel.com writes: On 03/09/2015 05:03 PM, Kees Cook wrote: On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/09/2015 05:03 PM, Kees Cook wrote: On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 4:43 PM, Eric W. Biederman ebied...@xmission.com wrote: A 1 to 1 blinding function like integer multiplication mudulo 2^32 by an appropriate random number ought to keep from revealing page numbers or page ajacencies while not

Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

2015-03-09 Thread Dave Hansen
On 03/09/2015 04:08 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: If the concern is to protect against root getting into the kernel the trusted_kernel snake-oil just compile out the pagemap file. Nothing else is remotely interesting from a mainenance point of view. The paper I linked to showed one example of