On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:21:56PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 4:00 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 03, 2018 at 10:38:24PM +, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >> +#define nospec_array_load(arr, idx, sz)
> >>\
> >> +({
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 4:00 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 03, 2018 at 10:38:24PM +, Mark Rutland wrote:
>> +#define nospec_array_load(arr, idx, sz)
>> \
>> +({ \
>> + typeof(*(ar
On Wed, Jan 03, 2018 at 10:38:24PM +, Mark Rutland wrote:
> +#define nospec_array_load(arr, idx, sz)
> \
> +({ \
> + typeof(*(arr)) *__arr = arr;\
> +
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.
This patch adds helpers which can be used to inhibit the use of
out-of-bounds pointers
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