Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE

2019-06-04 Thread Jarkko Sakkinen
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:31:55PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > To support LSM integration, SGX will require userspace to explicitly > specify the allowed protections for each page. The allowed protections > will be supplied to and modified by LSMs (based on their policies). How the

RE: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE

2019-06-03 Thread Xing, Cedric
> From: Christopherson, Sean J > Sent: Friday, May 31, 2019 4:32 PM > > To support LSM integration, SGX will require userspace to explicitly specify > the allowed > protections for each page. The allowed protections will be supplied to and > modified by > LSMs (based on their policies). > To

[RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE

2019-05-31 Thread Sean Christopherson
To support LSM integration, SGX will require userspace to explicitly specify the allowed protections for each page. The allowed protections will be supplied to and modified by LSMs (based on their policies). To prevent userspace from circumventing the allowed protections, do not allow