Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-10 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 01:23:35PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > It can send plaintext packets that will be stored encrypted in memory. > (Of course the hypervisor can do that too if it has access to the guest > network). And then what? You need to find out where exactly (which pages) got the pac

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-10 Thread Paolo Bonzini
On 09/05/2016 23:08, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 05/09/2016 10:13 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> >> >> On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register >>> state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out >>> through th

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 05/09/2016 10:13 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > > > On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register >> state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out >> through the VMCB and/or GPRs. > > No, it doesn't. And SEV

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-09 Thread Paolo Bonzini
On 02/05/2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register > state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out > through the VMCB and/or GPRs. No, it doesn't. And SEV is very limited unless you paravirtualize everything. Fo

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-03 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 04/30/2016 01:13 AM, Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) wrote: >> -Original Message- >> From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-kernel- >> ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Tom Lendacky >> Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 5:56 PM >> Sub

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-05-02 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 04/27/2016 09:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky >> wrote: >>> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >>> Encryption (SME) feature. >>> >>> SME can be used to mark in

RE: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-29 Thread Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
> -Original Message- > From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:linux-kernel- > ow...@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Tom Lendacky > Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 5:56 PM > Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) > > This RFC patch se

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 04/27/2016 09:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >> Encryption (SME) feature. >> >> SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the >> page tables.

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > > system?". > > Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from > the 0th mail which you c

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:39:51, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > > system?". > > Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from > the 0th mail which you c

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory > Encryption (SME) feature. > > SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the > page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be aut

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 04:30:45PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > That does not answer the question. "Why would I want SME on my > system?". Because your question wasn't formulated properly. Here's some text from the 0th mail which you could've found on your own: "The following links provide additi

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
On Wed 2016-04-27 16:05:20, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. > > Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off. That does not answer the question. "Why would I wan

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 03/22/2016 08:00 AM, Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > >> This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory >> Encryption (SME) feature. >> >> SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the >> page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 02:00:58PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > Why would I want SME on my system? My system seems to work without it. Your system doesn't have it and SME is default off. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-27 Thread Pavel Machek
Hi! > This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory > Encryption (SME) feature. > > SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the > page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically > decrypted when read from DRAM and w

[RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-26 Thread Tom Lendacky
This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and will be automatica

[RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2016-04-26 Thread Tom Lendacky
This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and will be automatica