On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:21:13PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> The GHCB would have to be allocated much earlier, possibly even by
> firmware depending on how things will be designed.
How about a statically allocated page like we do with the early
pagetable pages in head_64.S?
> I think it's pre
On 28/03/2017 20:39, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> 2) Since the encryption attributes works on PAGE_SIZE hence add some extra
>> padding to 'struct kvm-steal-time' to make it PAGE_SIZE and then at runtime
>> clear the encryption attribute of the full PAGE. The downside of this was
>> now we need to m
On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:15:36AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
> variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
> It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS. When SEV is active,
> guest
On 02/03/2017 16:15, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
> variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
> It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS. When SEV is active,
> guest memory is encrypted
Some KVM specific MSR's (steal-time, asyncpf, avic_eio) allocates per-CPU
variable at compile time and share its physical address with hypervisor.
It presents a challege when SEV is active in guest OS. When SEV is active,
guest memory is encrypted with guest key and hypervisor will no longer able
t
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